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The dissertation is composed of two papers, and attempts to draw a more 
complete picture of the processes underlying consumers’ emotional experiences by 
studying antecedents of somatic marker activation and the downstream impact of 
activated somatic states on consumer behavior.  
The first paper studies the downstream impact of activated somatic states on 
consumers’ experience of regret. This paper challenges the predominant view in the 
literature that regret is a cognitive emotion that stems from deliberation by showing 
that the experience of regret can stem from spontaneous bodily arousal. 
The second paper examines an antecedent and downstream consequences of 
somatic marker activation in a consumption setting. By examining how modes of 
payment (i.e., cash vs. card) impact the activation of somatic states and how the 
somatic states curb impulsive purchase intention, this paper contributes to the 
literature on mode of payment through more fundamental conceptualization of 
underlying emotional processes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  
 Emotion has long been considered detrimental to sound decision making by 
philosophers as well as lay people. This tradition is well-reflected in the studies of 
decision research wherein emotion has not received much attention until recently. 
Decision researchers have traditionally viewed the process of decision making as a 
cognitive, emotion-free, process wherein decision makers deliberatively evaluate the 
consequences of choosing each alternative then choose an alternative that will 
maximize the utility. Behavioral decision theory focused largely on identifying 
cognitive errors people make in the process of evaluating each alternative and 
understanding heuristics that people use to simplify the decision process. The potential 
role that emotions could play in the decision process was largely ignored in the earlier 
studies of behavioral decision theory. This trend started changing as several decision 
theorists incorporated anticipated emotion in their decision models. For example, Bell 
(1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) incorporated anticipated regret into their 
decision models and argued that decision makers compare the utility associated with 
each decision alternative and choose the option that minimizes regret. Past few 
decades have witnessed a growing interest in understanding roles that different 
emotions play in decision making as researchers have studies how integral emotions 
(emotions that arise intrinsically from decision-relevant stimuli or decision process) as 
well as incidental emotions (emotions that arise from sources that are extrinsic to 
decision process)  influence decision making. With the growing interest, it can be 
argued with no difficulty that contemporary decision research considers emotion to be 
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an integral part of decision making.  
 A question about emotions that has fascinated many psychologists is the way 
affect and cognition interact in the experience of emotions. The early research on 
emotions in modern psychology (i.e., post-behaviorism era) was led by psychologists 
who emphasized the role of cognitive appraisals on the experience of emotions. 
Magda Arnold, considered to be the pioneer of cognitive theory of emotion, laid the 
groundwork for decades of emotions research with the publication of her book 
“Emotion and Personality” (Arnold 1960). In this book, Arnold argued that in order to 
experience emotion towards a target object, a person needs to acquire factual beliefs 
(i.e., what is the object?) as well as evaluative beliefs (i.e., how is the object going to 
affect me?) about the target. Arnold believed that the cognitive processes involved in 
the acquisition of the factual and evaluative beliefs determine the specific emotions 
that a person experiences. Specifically, she proposed evaluation of the valence, 
presence, and coping potential to be three dimensions of appraisals that influence the 
experience of emotions. She used these three dimensions to specify the cognitive 
preconditions that induce different emotions. Arnold’s cognitive theory of emotion 
had a significant impact on the research of Richard Lazarus who also proposed that 
cognitive appraisal plays an essential role in the experience of emotions (Lazarus 
1966). Lazarus posited that a person appraises the implication of an event on her well-
being, or the adaptational significance, and the result of this appraisal determines the 
type of emotion that the person experiences. Lazarus’s theory is characterized by two 
types of appraisals: primary appraisal and secondary appraisal. Primary appraisal 
concerns the relevance of the event to the person’s well-being whereas secondary 
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appraisal concerns the assessment of the person’s ability and resources to cope with 
the event. This appraisal theory has had significant influence on the decades of 
emotion research that followed. A seminal work by Stanley Schachter and Jerome 
Singer (1962) also highlighted the role of cognition as an important ingredient of 
emotion. Schacter and Singer proposed that the state of physiological arousal by itself 
is not sufficient to induce an emotional state and its cause needs to be cognitively 
explained in order for a person to experience a specific emotion. To test this 
proposition, Schacter and Singer injected study participants with either an arousal-
inducing substance or a placebo. Some of these participants were given the 
explanation that the injection will induce arousal while the other participants were not. 
Then the participants were exposed to a situation that could be used to cognitively 
attribute their aroused states. Consistent with the proposition, only the participants 
who were injected with the arousal-inducing substance and were not given the 
explanation for their aroused stated (and thus engaged in cognitive attribution of their 
aroused states) demonstrated signs of emotional experiences. The research program by 
Nico Frijda and colleagues (Frijda 1986; Frijda, Luipers, and ter Schure 1989) further 
contributed to this stream of research by suggesting that in addition to cognitive 
appraisal, emotions involve states of action readiness, the degree to which a person is 
prepared to interact with the environment.  
 The belief that cognitive mediation is a prerequisite of emotion was challenged 
by Robert Zajonc (1980). Zajonc argued that cognitive mediation is not necessary for 
a person to experience emotions. In a series of studies, Zajonc demonstrated “mere 
exposure” effect wherein repeated exposure to a stimulus increased liking of the 
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stimulus in the absence of conscious recognition. Zajonc went on to argue that affect 
and cognition are two distinct processes that can manifest without the involvement of 
the other. The debate between Zajonc and Lazarus on whether cognitive mediation is 
necessary in the experience of emotions continued for decades (Lazarus 1982; 1984; 
1999, Zajonc 1984; 2000) and this question has intrigued many researchers interested 
in studying emotions.   
 Among several streams of research that suggests the separation of affect and 
cognition, and the stream that is of particular interest in my dissertation, is the studies 
of the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio 1994). The research on the somatic marker 
hypothesis focuses on how emotions guide sound decision making by mediating the 
interaction between decision environment and decision maker. According to the 
somatic marker hypothesis, perception or anticipation of objects or events triggers 
reflexive changes in the bodily or somatic states of the perceiver. Such changes can 
take the form that is obvious to external observers (e.g., posture, facial expression), as 
well as the form that is very subtle and not as obvious (e.g., skin conductance, heart 
rate). The ensemble of somatic responses is defined as emotion which provides 
essential ingredients to the experience of conscious feelings and guides decision 
making. The somatic marker hypothesis suggests that the experience of emotion does 
not require cognitive mediation. Somatic responses can be induced from two types of 
inducers – primary inducers and secondary inducers. Primary inducers are objects or 
experiences the presence of which automatically induces pleasurable or aversive 
states. Somatic activation from primary inducers can be innate (e.g., fear response to a 
snake on a child’s first encounter with a snake) as well as learned and shaped through 
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experiences during the socialization process (e.g., stress response to reviewers’ 
comments on a rejected manuscript). Secondary inducers are the thoughts or memories 
of primary inducers. Recalled or hypothetical consideration of primary inducers can 
function as secondary inducers and induce somatic states that are associated with the 
corresponding primary inducers. It has been shown that amygdala plays an important 
role in the activation of somatic states in the presence of primary inducers and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) plays an important role in the activation of 
somatic states in the presence of secondary inducers. In summary, the somatic marker 
hypothesis posits that our body and brain play an essential role in the experience of 
emotion in reaction to different stimuli in the decision context and the emotion, which 
is the collection of bodily responses towards the stimuli, guides proper decision 
making.  
 The early interest in the study of how emotions, manifested as bodily and brain 
responses, guide beneficial decision making stemmed from the observation of Phineas 
Gage (Harlow 1868). Gage was an active young man who worked as a railroad 
construction worker, a smart and shrewd man who was an efficient worker and 
likeable person before an accident changed everything. Mishandling of explosives at 
work caused a large iron rod to penetrate through Gage’s brain. Gage miraculously 
survived the accident and to everyone’s surprise, the injury to the brain did not take 
away his cognitive abilities. He was still the same rational thinker that he had been 
before the accident. However, the brain injury brought about significant changes to 
Gage’s personality and social behavior as he became seemingly unable to control his 
emotions. He became noticeably rude and violent to people he interacted with and his 
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judgment and decision making became myopic. The failure to regulate emotions cost 
Gage his professional career and his social life. The case of Phineas Gage and other 
patients with similar brain injuries stimulated interest among neuroscientists in 
understanding the interaction of affect and cognition in the experience of emotions and 
the important role that emotions play in guiding proper social behavior and decision 
making. This interest led to the programmatic studies of the somatic marker 
hypothesis.  
Influenced heavily by its origin, typical empirical testing of the somatic marker 
hypothesis involves the comparison of the behavior and physiological responses 
between brain lesion patients whose emotional experiences are impaired and control 
participants without such brain damages. The decision task that researchers often 
implement to test the somatic marker hypothesis is Iowa Gambling Task (IGT, 
Bechara et al. 1994). In IGT, participants draw cards, one card at a time, from any of 
the four decks of cards. Each draw results in a gain and some of the draws result in a 
penalty and participants are given the goal of maximizing the game money they are 
given in the beginning. Unbeknownst to the participants, two of the decks are designed 
to be “good” decks – a single draw from either of these decks offers a small immediate 
gain of $50 but it comes with a smaller penalty of $250 per 10 draws. The two other 
decks are “bad” decks – a single draw from either of these decks offers a larger 
immediate gain of $100 but it comes with a severe penalty of $1250 per 10 draws. 
Thus, the game is structured such that it is more advantageous to draw from the 
“good” decks despite the smaller immediate gain. Since the structure is unknown to 
the participants, in the early stage, both participants with brain lesions and control 
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participants tend to choose more from the “bad” decks that offer larger immediate 
gains. As the task continues, control participants implicitly learn the structure from 
their experience and avoid the “bad” decks. However, the same experience of larger 
loss does not change the behavior of the participants with brain lesions as they 
continue to draws cards from the “bad” decks and go bankrupt. Researchers attribute 
the poor performance by brain lesion patients to the absence of somatic marker 
activation and emotions (Damasio 1996; Bechara et al. 1999; Bechara et al. 2000; 
Tranel et al. 2002). The direct support for the somatic account of the poor performance 
comes from the analyses of skin conductance pattern, a widely used measure of 
somatic marker activation (Bechara et al. 2000). After playing a few rounds and 
implicitly learn the structures, control participants experience higher anticipatory skin 
conductance activity when they consider drawing a card from a “bad” deck. However, 
no such changes are observable from the brain lesion patients. That is, the absence of 
emotion, captured by the absence of somatic marker activation, prevents people from 
identifying and avoiding disadvantageous decisions.  
With the two essays in my dissertation, I extend the somatic marker hypothesis 
to the realm of consumer behavior by studying the antecedents of somatic marker 
activation and the downstream impact of activated somatic states in consumption 
contexts. In doing so I contribute to the literature on the somatic marker hypothesis by 
studying how environmental factors, rather than individual differences caused by brain 
damages, can influence somatic marker activation and how the activated somatic 
states function in the contexts that closely resemble our daily lives, rather than in a 
contrived task. Examining the role of bodily responses in addition to the traditional 
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self-report measure of emotion provides a researcher a unique opportunity to 
contribute to the study of consumers’ emotional experiences (Shiv et al. 2005). 
Specifically, in my first essay, I examine the role of skin conductance response on 
consumers’ experience of consumption regret. Previous research on regret has largely 
characterized regret as an outcome of deliberative thinking; that is, regret is based on 
and influenced by deliberative evaluations of behaviors. In this research, I argue that 
the feeling of regret can also stem from a spontaneous bodily response rather than 
from a higher order cognitive process. By investing the involvement of spontaneous 
bodily response in the experience of arousal, I contribute to the literature on regret by 
refining the regret construct. In my second essay, I investigate how different methods 
of payment results in differential activation of skin conductance responses and how 
the activated somatic state explains consumers’ food purchasing decisions. The study 
shows that skin conductance level is higher when people pay with cash than with 
cards, and this effect of mode of payment is stronger when people make decisions on 
tempting yet unhealthy vice food items. The study further shows that people are less 
likely to buy those unhealthy food items when skin conductance level is higher. With 
these findings, I contribute to the literature on mode of payment through more 
fundamental conceptualization of underlying emotional process. Overall, in this 
dissertation, I seek to draw a more complete picture of the processes underlying 
consumers’ cognition and emotions and contribute to both the literature in the somatic 
marker hypothesis and consumer research.  
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PAPER 1: AROUSAL AS A SOMATIC MARKER IN THE EXPERIENCE OF 
CONSUMPTION REGRET 
 
 Regret is an emotion people experience when they realize their current 
situation would have been better had they made different decisions in the past. 
Because the painful experience of regret reminds people of mistakes they made in the 
past and motivates them to avoid the reoccurrence of similar mistakes, regret is 
considered a beneficial emotion that plays an active role in behavioral remediation 
(Pieters and Zeelenberg 2007; Saffery, Summerville, and Roese 2008; Zeelenberg 
1999; Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007). Regret is a unique emotion that is often 
characterized as a cognitive emotion. In fact, early discussion of regret in behavioral 
science was led by Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) who introduced it in 
the study of behavioral decision theory, a field of study that traditionally viewed 
decision making as a deliberative process and largely ignored the role of emotions. 
Specifically, Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) incorporated regret into the 
calculation of utility function and characterized it as an outcome of cognitive 
comparison of what the current utility is and what the utility would have been had 
people chosen differently. That is, early research on regret conceptualized it as a 
cognitive construct that is experienced after careful deliberation of counterfactuals. 
The characterization of regret as a cognitive emotion is still a prevalent view in the 
literature. To quote a few influential researchers in the literature of regret, Zeelenberg 
(1999, p. 326) notes that “regret is the negative, cognitively based emotion that we 
experience when realizing or imagining that our present situation would have been 
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better had we acted differently” and Gilovich and Medvec (1995, p. 379) state that 
“judgment is more central to the experience of regret than, say, the experience of 
jealousy or anger.” In their review of the literature on regret, Zeelenberg and Pieters 
(2007) argue that regret is a “cognitive emotion” the experience of which stems from 
higher order cognition that requires the reflection on the choices made as well as the 
alternatives that were not chosen. 
 In the current research, we challenge this prevalent view that regret is 
predominantly cognition and that deliberation plays an essential role in its experience. 
Building on the literature on the somatic marker hypothesis which suggests that 
conscious experience of feelings stems from the automatic reactions of human body 
and brain (Bechara and Damasio 2005; Damasio 1994; 1996), we propose that the 
experience of regret can stem from spontaneous affective reactions rather than from 
deliberative evaluation of the regrettable behavior and counterfactuals. Specifically we 
argue that a person experiences spontaneous bodily arousal when she is reminded of 
her regrettable past behavior and the intensity of this arousal determines how regretful 
the person feels about the behavior. We further argue that deliberating on the behavior 
changes the effect of arousal on regret. Thus, the current research contributes to the 
literature in regret by studying an important question about the interplay of affect and 
cognition in the experience of regret that remains unanswered (Inman 2007; Roese, 
Summerville, and Fessel 2007). 
We examine the interplay of affect and cognition in the experience of regret in 
the context of food consumption regret, a domain where regret plays an important role 
in regulation and remediation of unhealthy behavior (Inman 2007). Habitual 
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consumption of unhealthy food items that are rich in sugar and fat could lead to 
negative health consequences such as weight gain, increased risk of diabetes, impaired 
immune system, and other chronic diseases. Furthermore, larger consumption 
quantities result in more regrettable consequences. How does an individual experience 
consumption regret? If an individual experienced consumption regret through a 
deliberative process as suggested by decision scientists, she would first evaluate the 
consequence of her vice consumption by considering the frequency and the amount of 
her consumption. Then she would identify alternative decisions she could have made 
(e.g., not consuming anything at all, consuming healthier options, etc.) then evaluate 
the consequences of those alternative actions. Finally, she would compare these 
consequences and experience stronger regret if there is a large discrepancy between 
the amount she consumed and the amount she could have consumed had she decided 
differently and weaker regret if there is a small discrepancy. While we agree that this 
is one possible way of experiencing consumption regret, we propose that there is an 
alternative approach that is influenced more by spontaneous affective reactions and is 
more representative of how people actually experience their consumption regret. 
Specifically, we argue that people can also experience consumption regret reflexively 
by attending to the spontaneous bodily arousal induced when they bring to their mind 
the mental image of the unhealthy food items they consumed. That is, if someone were 
to ask Mary how regretful she feels about her pizza consumption, Mary is more likely 
to rely on the negative arousal induced by the mental image of greasy pizza rather than 
consider how many calories she consumed from eating pizza and compare how many 
calories she could have cut down had she chosen salad instead.  
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While we focus on consumption regret in the current research to study the 
interaction of affect and cognition in the experience of regret, we believe the same 
framework can be applied to many other retrospective evaluations of regrettable 
behaviors. For example, if a person bought a pair of shoes a week before the sale, she 
could evaluate her regret either by considering the magnitude of the sale or by relying 
on the instant pang she experiences when she sees the sale sign on the shop’s window. 
Similarly, if a person installed a new part to his car then hears a news about the safety 
issues regarding the part, he could evaluate his regret either by considering what other 
alternative brands he could have chosen and how much more expensive or cheaper 
they would have been or by relying on the instant pang he experiences as he hears the 
news about the safety issue.  
In the following sections, we first review the literature that motivates our 
hypotheses and then present four experiments designed to test these hypotheses. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
Affective Evaluation of Regret 
 
The somatic marker hypothesis is a stream of research that examines how 
emotions guide sound decision making by mediating the interaction between decision 
environment and decision maker (Bechara and Damasio 2005; Damasio 1994; 1996). 
According to the somatic marker hypothesis, perception of objects or events, whether 
actual or recalled, triggers reflexive changes in the bodily or somatic states of the 
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perceiver. These spontaneous reactions are shaped through learning from previous 
experiences with the target, and the reactions can take the form that is obvious to 
external observers (e.g., posture, facial expression), as well as the form that is very 
subtle and not as obvious (e.g., skin conductance, heart rate). The collection of 
somatic responses that take place even in the absence of effortful cognitive mediation 
is defined as emotion and this emotion provides important ingredients to the 
experience of conscious feelings and guides decision making. Somatic responses can 
be induced from objects or experiences the presence of which automatically induces 
pleasurable or aversive states (i.e., primary inducers) as well as the thoughts or 
memories of primary inducers (i.e., secondary inducers). Somatic responses can be 
innate (e.g., aversive feelings experienced from the smell of sewage) as well as 
learned and shaped through experiences during the socialization process (e.g., uneasy 
feelings to consume pizza after learning how fattening it can be). It has been shown 
that amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex in human brain play an essential role 
in the activation of somatic states. In sum, the somatic marker hypothesis posits that 
our body and brain play an important role in the experience of emotions in reaction to 
different stimuli and the experience of emotions does not require effortful cognitive 
mediation. It should be noted that while the terms “emotion” and “feeling” are often 
used interchangeably by many researchers, the two terms refer to different phenomena 
in the study of the somatic marker hypothesis as the former refers to the collection of 
bodily responses to stimuli while the latter refers to more conscious experience that 
results from the former. In this research, we characterize the experience of bodily 
arousal as “emotion” and characterize the conscious experience of regret as “feeling.”  
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Typical empirical testing of the somatic marker hypothesis involves the 
comparison of the behavior and physiological responses between patients who have 
brain lesions that prevent emotional experiences and control participants without such 
brain lesions. The task that researchers often implement in the testing of the 
hypothesis is Iowa Gambling Task (IGT, Bechara et al. 1994; 2000) wherein 
participants draw cards, one card at a time, from any of the four decks of cards. 
Unbeknownst to the participants, half of the decks are designed to be riskier than the 
other half and the task is designed such that it is more prudent to avoid these riskier 
decks. Participants without the brain lesion implicitly learn the structure with the help 
of negative feelings and avoid the riskier decks as the task proceeds to the later 
rounds. However, patients with the brain lesion whose decisions are not guided by 
their emotional experiences fail to learn the structure, keep drawing from the riskier 
deck, and perform poorly in the task. The involvement of bodily responses in this 
performance discrepancy is clearly demonstrated with the pattern of skin conductance, 
a widely used measure of somatic marker activation (Bechara et al. 2000). Whereas 
the control participants without the brain lesions experience increase in skin 
conductance when they experience or anticipate loss but this pattern of skin 
conductance activity is not found among the brain lesion patients. These findings 
support the somatic marker hypothesis by showing that spontaneous reactions at the 
bodily level provide essential ingredients for the conscious experience of feelings, 
which in turn guides behavior and decision making.  
Following the somatic marker hypothesis, we posit that the conscious 
experience of regretful feeling can stem from spontaneously elicited and negatively-
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valenced physiological arousal. When a person is reminded of her past consumption of 
sugary doughnuts or calorie-rich pizza, to the extent such stimuli are categorized as 
unhealthy in her cultural milieu, she will spontaneously experience physiological 
arousal, which is a learned affective response to the food items that are automatically 
categorized as vice. Once this arousal is experienced in the body proper, she will rely 
on this arousal to reflexively evaluate how regretful her past consumption feels 
without considering the extent (i.e., frequency or consumed calorie amount) of 
consumption. Therefore, we hypothesize that consumption regret is sensitive to the 
intensity of bodily arousal but insensitive to the extent of consumption.   
 
Deliberative Evaluation of Regret 
 
While we argue that natural evaluation of consumption regret stems from 
spontaneous bodily arousal, we do not suggest that people cannot experience regret 
through deliberative consideration of consumption extent (i.e., consumption frequency 
or calorie consumption amount). People naturally neglect the deliberative analysis of 
consumption extent not because it is perceived to be irrelevant but because the 
deliberative process is not fast enough to enter the picture before people have already 
experienced regretful feeling through the spontaneous affect-driven process (for the 
discussion on the relative speed of affective and reflective processing, see Kahneman 
and Frederick 2002; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999; Zajonc, Pietromonaco, and Bargh 
1982). How would people evaluate consumption regret when they do consider the 
extent of their consumption? How would the bodily arousal and the deliberation on  
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consumption extent interact to influence the experience of regret?  
A long tradition of folk wisdom dating back to the discussions of Greek and 
Roman philosophers in portraying the interplay of affect and cognition has led to the 
lay belief that deliberative cognitive evaluations are more diagnostic or useful than 
spontaneous affective evaluations (Anderson 2007; Baumeister, DeWall, and Zhang 
2007). We argue that due to this lay belief, people generally consider deliberative 
evaluation of the extent of the behavior to be more diagnostic than arousal-based 
affective evaluation when making evaluative judgments. This is particularly true in the 
context of consumption evaluation where consumption estimation such as counting 
calories is generally believed to be a useful tool for evaluating unhealthiness. Extent 
evaluations in consumption behavior typically entail quantification of the extent of the 
consumption. In the context of consumption behavior evaluations, examples of extent 
evaluations are consumption rate evaluation (e.g., “how many servings did I consume 
per week”) or calorie estimation (e.g., “how many calories did I consume”). People 
have a lay belief that such quantitative evaluations are more diagnostic than 
evaluations based on affective reactions to the unhealthiness of the food item.  
According to the literature in memory-based evaluation, when more than one 
source of input is available and accessible during an evaluation, the input with higher 
perceived diagnosticity or relevance is more likely to be used while others are ignored 
(Feldman and Lynch 1988; Lynch, Marmorstein, and Weigold 1988). Therefore, when 
both bodily arousal and the deliberatively considered consumption extent are available 
and accessible for regret evaluation, we argue that people rely on deliberative extent 
evaluation that is perceived to be more diagnostic while relying less on bodily arousal 
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that is perceived to be less diagnostic.  
 
Contextual Cues Can Influence Regret Evaluation 
 
Perceived diagnosticity is a heuristic assessment of the necessity and the 
sufficiency of the informational input to make the judgment. Because perceived 
diagnosticity is a heuristic assessment, it can be influenced by contextual cues. During 
regret evaluation, contextual cues can enhance the perceived diagnosticity of the 
bodily arousal. When both bodily arousal and deliberative consideration of 
consumption extent are equally accessible, people generally consider deliberative 
extent evaluations to be more diagnostic, end up relying less on arousal. However, 
even when both inputs are accessible, if contextual cues increase the perceived 
diagnosticity of arousal-based affective evaluations, people will rely on bodily arousal. 
That is, consumption regret can be sensitive to bodily arousal even when the extent of 
consumption is made salient if contextual cues increase the perceived diagnosticity of 
arousal. 
In summary, this research proposes a parsimonious framework to predict 
behavior evaluations by building on the somatic marker hypothesis (Bechara and 
Damasio 2005; Damasio 1994; 1996). Three guiding principles are proposed to 
explain how people experience regret. First, people usually experience consumption 
regret by relying on bodily arousal while neglecting the extent of their consumption. 
Second, increasing the salient of consumption extent makes people attentive to extent 
evaluation but this reduces attention to arousal. Third, if contextual cues increase the 
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perceived diagnosticity of arousal, people do not neglect arousal even when 
consumption extent is salient. Now we present four experiments that test this 
framework.  
 
 Overview of Studies 
 
We conducted four experiments to test these hypotheses. In study 1, we 
demonstrate arousal-based evaluation of regret using skin conductance data and show 
that making salient the extent of consumption reduces attention to arousal. In study 2, 
we demonstrate extent neglect during arousal-based evaluation and explore the nature 
of deliberative evaluation of regret. In study 3, we manipulate the salience of arousal 
and consumption extent and in study 4, we manipulate the perceived diagnosticity of 
arousal to further examine the interplay of affect and cognition in the experience of 
consumption regret.  
 
Study 1: The Role of Spontaneous Arousal in the Experience of Regret 
 
This study was designed to demonstrate the role of arousal in the experience of 
consumption regret. Participants were asked to evaluate how much they regret their 
consumption of calorie rich food such as cakes, cookies, and pizza. Some participants 
made the evaluation without any prompt (natural mode) whereas the others were asked 
to consider the extent of their consumption before making the evaluation (deliberative 
mode). We predicted that consumption regret experienced by participants in the 
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natural mode (who were not prompted to consider the extent of their behavior) will be 
highly sensitive to the intensity of bodily arousal whereas consumption regret 
experienced by participants in the deliberative mode will be less sensitive to the 
intensity of bodily arousal. To test these predictions, we measured participants’ skin 
conductance levels (electrodermal activity: EDA), a commonly used physiological 
measure of arousal, as they evaluated their consumption regret. This physiological 
measure enables us to test the specific mechanism through which arousal and 
deliberation interact during the experience of consumption regret. There are two 
different ways through which deliberating on consumption extent can reduce the effect 
of arousal on consumption regret: it could either reduce the intensity of arousal 
(arousal intensity account) or it could reduce the attention to arousal without affecting 
the intensity (arousal attention account). Per the intensity account, we should expect 
to see higher level of arousal in the natural mode and relatively lower level of arousal 
in the deliberative mode. Per the attention account, we should expect to see similar 
levels of arousal in the two modes but observe higher correlation between arousal and 
consumption regret in the natural mode than in the deliberative mode. We test both of 
these possible mechanisms in this study. 
In addition, to show that the effect of deliberation on arousal is robust across 
different time frames used for deliberative extent evaluation, we included a narrow 
frame of extent evaluation (number of servings per day) as well as a broad frame of 
extent evaluation (number of servings per year). Thus, this experiment uses a three cell 
design with three different evaluation modes: natural, extent-deliberation 1 (number of 
servings consumed per day), and extent-deliberation 2 (number of servings consumed 
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per year). Finally, we wanted to compare the intensity of consumption regret 
experienced in the natural mode and the deliberative mode to see if the different ways 
through which regret is experienced also result in different intensity of consumption 
regret. Therefore, the intensity of physiological arousal and the intensity of reported 
consumption regret were the main dependent measures in this study. 
 
Method 
 
Participants and Design 
The experiment was administered in a behavioral laboratory at a U.S. 
university. One hundred and one students (57 women; age 20.8 years) from the 
university campus were recruited to participate in a thirty-minute session. They were 
paid $5 for their participation in a series of unrelated studies that lasted for about 30 
minutes. The study used a 3 (evaluation mode: natural, extent-deliberation 1 (daily), 
extent-deliberation 2 (annual)) x 9 (food category replicates: chocolates/candies, 
cakes, cookies, doughnuts, French fries, hotdogs, potato-chips, soda, and pizza) mixed 
factorial experimental design with evaluation mode as a between-subjects variable and 
food category as a within-subjects variable. 
Procedure 
A research assistant familiar with skin conductance measurement protocols 
administered the experiment, one participant at a time, in the laboratory. Before 
participating in the main study, participants were asked to wear Affectiva’s 
electrodermal activity (EDA) measurement device on the palms of their non-dominant 
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hands (see Appendix 1A). The research assistant ensured that participants’ palms were 
dry and clean before the EDA measurement device was strapped on. After the device 
was strapped on their non-dominant hands, participants responded to the 
questionnaires on the computer screen with their dominant hands. The time on the 
computer was synchronized with the time on the EDA measurement device, so that we 
could associate each skin conductance reading to the task on the computer screen. The 
EDA measurement device recorded EDA in microsiemens at the rate of 2 recordings 
per second. Trial runs with the EDA measurement apparatus revealed that skin 
conductance levels increase slowly and it takes several minutes before the EDA level 
stabilizes for a participant. To ensure that the skin conductance levels are stabilized 
before the main study (i.e., the consumption regret study), participants were asked to 
clench and stretch their hands 10 times, and read aloud 36 simple and complex multi-
syllable linguistic stimuli.  
Baseline EDA  
Baseline EDA is the average tonic level of an individual’s EDA in the absence 
of the test stimulus. It is customary to control for the baseline skin conductance levels 
to remove the variance in data caused by individual differences in baseline levels of 
EDA (see Boucsein 1992 for a detailed discussion). To measure baseline skin 
conductance, at the beginning of the main study, all participants were exposed to an 
initialization screen titled “Food study” with pictures of some food items and a brief 
instruction that this is a survey on consumption of some food items. This screen was 
identical across all conditions. For each participant, the average skin conductance 
measured on this initialization screen was used as the baseline skin conductance level. 
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Random Assignment to Conditions  
After the measurement of baseline EDA, participants were randomly assigned 
to one of three conditions. For each food category, participants in the extent-
deliberation 1 (daily) condition were asked to report how many servings they consume 
per day before reporting their consumption regret. They submitted their responses 
using an open ended text response box. Similarly, participants in the extent-
deliberation 2 (annual) condition were asked to report how many servings they 
consume per year. Participants in the natural condition were not asked to consider 
their consumption quantity.  
Consumption Regret 
Next, all participants were asked to evaluate how regretful they felt about the 
consumption of the food items in the nine categories. For each of the nine food 
categories, participants indicated their regret on a five point semantic differential scale 
(1= no regret at all, 5= very strong regret). The EDA apparatus recorded the EDA as 
participants evaluated their regret. Appendix 1B lists the details of the questions used 
in this study. 
 
Results  
 
The device used for EDA measurement did not record the skin conductance 
data for four participants (presumably because the contact between the electrodes and 
the skin was weak or because participants accidentally turned off the device). 
Additionally, one participant had the skin conductance device strapped on his 
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dominant hand with which he operated his mouse (contrary to the instructions). We 
excluded the responses from these five participants and used the data from the 
remaining 96 participants for our analyses.  
Arousal Intensity 
Since EDA measurements were collected at the rate of 2 recordings per 
second, for each participant we averaged the EDA recordings from the regret 
evaluation for each of the nine food categories. Thus, for each participant, we 
identified nine average EDA responses, one from the regret evaluation of each of the 
nine food categories. The average EDA responses varied from 0.12 microsiemens to 
17.92 microsiemens. This is consistent with observations reported in previous research 
(Boucsein 1992). To control for individual differences in baseline EDA, we identified 
the baseline EDA response for each participant. For each participant, the baseline 
EDA response was determined as the mean of EDA responses recorded during the 
initialization screen at the beginning of the main study.  
First, we tested whether the mode of evaluation changed the intensity of 
arousal. For this purpose, the EDA measurements recorded during the regret 
evaluation were submitted to a mixed model ANCOVA with evaluation mode as a 
between-subjects variable and food category replicate as a within-subjects factor. To 
control for the effect of individual differences in baseline levels of EDA, baseline 
EDA was entered as a covariate in the model. The intensity of arousal did not change 
across the conditions, (Mnatural = 4.60, Mextent-deliberation1(daily) = 4.63, Mextent-
deliberation2(annual) = 4.61), F(2, 92) = 0.05, p > .94. Figure 1A visually depicts the EDA 
responses across three conditions. This result suggests that deliberating on 
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consumption extent does not change the intensity of experienced bodily arousal per se. 
Thus, the arousal intensity account, which suggests that deliberating on consumption 
extent could reduce the intensity of arousal, is not supported. 
 
Figure 1A: Deliberating on Consumption Extent 
Does Not Influence Arousal Intensity (Study 1) 
 
 
Attention to Arousal  
Next, we tested the arousal attention account, namely, whether deliberating on 
the extent of consumption reduces the effect of arousal on the experience of regret 
without affecting the experienced intensity of arousal per se. First, as preliminary 
model-free evidence, we conducted correlation analyses, separately for each 
evaluation mode condition, to examine the correlation between baseline-line adjusted 
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EDA and consumption regret. We adjusted for the individual differences in EDA by 
subtracting the baseline EDA from the average EDA responses following the 
procedure recommended by Boucsein (1992). As predicted, the correlation between 
EDA and regret was stronger in the natural condition (r = .28, p < .001) than in extent-
deliberation 1 (daily) condition (r = .10, p = .10) or in extent-deliberation 2 (annual) 
condition (r = .16, p < .01). While such correlational analyses do provide preliminary 
evidence, they fail to take into account the fact that multiple observations were made 
from each individual participant.  
To account for repeated observations from each participant, we ran repeated 
measures regression analyses capturing the effect of arousal on regret in the three 
conditions. The analyses were done using the MIXED Procedure in SAS. Reported 
regret was regressed on baseline-adjusted EDA, dummy variable 1 (set to 1 for daily 
condition and 0 for the other conditions), dummy variable 2 (set to1 for the annual 
condition and 0 for the other conditions), the interaction term of baseline-adjusted 
EDA and dummy variable 1, and the interaction term of baseline-adjusted EDA and 
dummy variable 2. The coefficient of EDA was positive and significant in this model, 
β = 1.63, p < .001, suggesting that consumption regret in the natural condition 
increased with arousal intensity. The interaction between dummy variable 1 and EDA 
was marginally significant, β = -1.23, p = .06, suggesting that the effect of EDA was 
weaker in the daily condition than in the natural condition. Similarly, interaction 
between dummy variable 2 and EDA was significant, β = -1.24, p < .05, suggesting 
that the effect of EDA was also weaker in the annual condition than in the natural 
condition. A follow up analysis of simple slopes (Aiken and West 1991) showed that 
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EDA was not a significant predictor of regret in neither the daily condition, β = .40, p 
> .35, nor the annual condition β = .39, p > .25. Figure 1B visually depicts the 
relationship between regret and EDA responses across three conditions. The 
discrepancy between the natural mode and the deliberative mode also suggests that 
people do not naturally deliberate on the extent of consumption during their evaluation 
of consumption regret. 
 
Figure 1B: Deliberating on Consumption Extent  
Reduces Attention to Arousal (Study 1) 
 
 
These results support the arousal attention account and suggest that naturally, 
the experience of consumption regret stems from spontaneous bodily arousal but 
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deliberating on the extent of consumption reduces the effect of arousal on 
consumption regret.  
Intensity of Consumption Regret  
Next, we tested whether different ways of evaluating consumption arousal 
influenced the intensity of experienced consumption regret. Reported regret was 
compared using a mixed-design ANOVA with evaluation mode as a between-subjects 
factor and food category replicate as a within-subjects factor. There was a significant 
effect of evaluation mode on reported regret (Mnatural = 2.88, Mextent-deliberation1(daily) = 
2.29, Mextent-deliberation2(annual) = 2.39), F(2, 93) = 3.16, p < .05. Figure 1C presents a 
summary of the results across the three conditions. Planned contrast analyses suggest 
that regret evaluated in the natural condition was higher than regret reported in the 
extent-deliberation 1 (daily) condition, F(1, 93) = 5.56, p < .05, as well as the extent-
deliberation 2 (annual) condition, F(1, 93) = 3.64, p = .06. That is, deliberating on the 
extent of consumption reduced the intensity of experienced consumption regret. 
Again, the discrepancy between the natural mode and the deliberative mode suggests 
that people do not naturally deliberate on the extent of consumption when they 
evaluate consumption regret. Not surprisingly, the effect of food categories was 
significant F(8, 744) = 5.17, p < .001, suggesting that regret differed across food 
categories.  
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Figure 1C: Deliberating on Consumption Extent  
Reduces the Intensity of Consumption Regret (Study1) 
 
 
Discussion 
 
In this experiment, we tested whether the experience of regret naturally stems 
from spontaneous bodily arousal rather than from deliberation. We asked participants 
to indicate their consumption regret either naturally or after deliberating on the extent 
of their consumption. Participants’ EDA activities were measured throughout the 
study. The analysis of the EDA data suggests that the experience of consumption 
regret naturally stems from spontaneous bodily arousal but deliberating on the extent 
of consumption reduces the effect of arousal on consumption regret. The difference in 
the effect of arousal on regret across different modes of regret evaluation was not 
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caused by the different level of bodily arousal per se – deliberating on consumption 
extent did not reduce the intensity of arousal that participants experienced. However, 
participants who deliberated on their consumption extent did not attend to their bodily 
arousal presumably because the deliberation of consumption extent was perceived to 
be a more diagnostic input in the evaluation of consumption regret than bodily arousal. 
The proposed reliance on consumption extent in the deliberative mode will be more 
closely examined in study 2. We also found that experienced consumption regret was 
more intense when participants evaluated it naturally than when they evaluated it after 
deliberating on their consumption extent. While the different patterns found between 
the natural mode and the deliberative mode is suggestive of the possibility that people 
naturally do not deliberate on their consumption extent to evaluate consumption 
regret, the current study lacks direct evidence to support this claim. Also, it is not clear 
yet from this study why the intensity of regret is lower when people deliberate on their 
consumption extent. We answer these questions in the next study by directly 
examining the effect of consumption extent on consumption regret.   
 
Study 2: Direct Evidence of Changes in Extent Sensitivity 
 
This study was designed to serve two purposes. First, we directly test whether 
sensitivity to consumption extent changes across the two modes of evaluation. As in 
study 1, consumption regret was measured. All participants were asked to report how 
much they regret their past consumption, and estimate and evaluate the extent of their 
consumption. The order of these questions was manipulated across two conditions. 
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Half of the participants were asked to first estimate the extent of their consumption 
and evaluate the extent, and then report their consumption regret (deliberative mode). 
The other half first reported how much they regret their past consumption without any 
prompt and then estimated the extent of their consumption and evaluated the extent 
(natural mode). We examined to what extent their consumption regret was influenced 
by the extent of consumption. We predicted that consumption regret of the participants 
in the deliberative mode condition would be sensitive to the participants’ extent 
evaluation while regret of the participants in the natural mode condition would be less 
sensitive to the extent evaluation. In addition, using the extent sensitivity patterns in 
the two conditions, we explain why deliberating on consumption extent to evaluate 
regret reduces the intensity of regret.  
Second, to establish the generalizability of our results, we adopted a different 
type of extent evaluation with different time frame – namely, estimation of consumed 
calories per week. In addition, whereas study 1 was conducted in a lab setting with 
undergraduate students as participants, to further establish generalizability, this study 
was conducted in an online setting with a more representative sample on the internet.   
 
Method 
 
Participants and Design 
The experiment was administered as an internet-based study to participants 
recruited from an online panel. One hundred and two participants (59 women; average 
age: 31.8) completed the study for a small amount of money. The study had two 
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between-subjects conditions (evaluation mode: natural, deliberative) and six food 
category replicates (cakes, doughnuts, cookies, potato chips, ice cream, chocolates & 
candies) were used.  
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two between-subjects 
conditions (evaluation mode: natural, deliberative). Participants assigned to the 
deliberative condition were first asked to estimate their weekly calorie consumption 
amount for each of the six food categories. Participants submitted their estimates in 
open-ended text boxes. In addition, they were asked to evaluate the extent of their 
consumption behavior. Specifically, for each food category, they evaluated the extent 
of their consumption amount on a 5-point scale (1: low – 5: high). This subjective 
evaluation of consumption extent was conducted to account for individual differences; 
while some people could consider consuming 400 calories from candies per week 
high, others might consider the same amount low. Subsequently, they reported their 
consumption regret. The order of the questions was changed for participants assigned 
to the natural condition. These participants first reported their consumption regret 
without any prompt, then estimated their weekly calorie consumption amount, and 
finally evaluated the extent of their consumption amount using the 5-point scale.   
Finally, participants indicated their current mood (1 = very bad, 7 = very 
good), their involvement with the task (involved, attentive, careful, thoughtful), and 
demographic information including weight and height later used to compute BMI. An 
instructional manipulation check was administered in the end to identify participants 
who might not have followed the instructions (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko 
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2009) (see Appendix 2A for details of the questions used in this study). The measures 
reported in this paragraph were administered in all of the online studies (study 2, study 
3, and study 4) reported in this paper.  
 
Results  
 
Participants who failed the instructional manipulation check questions and 
those whose log-transformed completion time was more than three-standard deviations 
away from the mean were excluded from the analyses in this study and the other 
internet-based studies reported in this paper. Fourteen participants who failed the 
instructional manipulation check question and one participant who was an outlier on 
response time were excluded in this study. So the following results are based on 
responses from the remaining 87 participants. This data exclusion was done as a 
matter of abundant caution to reduce the effect of idiosyncratic participants; including 
these participants does not change the main results. The results of analyses without the 
exclusion are provided in the Appendix 2B. 
Intensity of Regret  
Reported regret was submitted to a 2 (evaluation mode: natural vs. 
deliberative) x 6 (food category) mixed model ANCOVA with evaluation mode as a 
between-subjects factor and food category as a within-subjects factor. To reduce the 
noise potentially caused by the heterogeneity of the online participants, participants’ 
BMI was entered as a covariate in the model. Replicating the result from the previous 
study, reported regret was higher when it was evaluated in the natural mode than in the 
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deliberative mode (Mnatural = 2.60, Mdeliberative = 2.10), F(1, 84) = 4.02, p < .05. The 
effect of food categories was significant, F(5, 425) = 3.21, p < .01, suggesting that 
reported regret differed across food categories.  
Attention to Consumption Extent  
To test whether attention to consumption extent varied across conditions, we 
ran repeated measures regression analyses capturing the effect of participants’ extent 
evaluation on reported regret in the two conditions. The analyses were done using the 
MIXED Procedure in SAS. Reported regret was regressed on extent evaluation, a 
dummy variable set to 1 for the deliberative condition, and their interaction term. In 
addition, the model controlled for participants’ BMI. The predicted interaction 
between the dummy variable and extent evaluation was significant, β = .28, p < .001, 
suggesting that the effect of extent evaluation on the intensity of experienced regret 
varied across the two conditions. A follow up analysis of simple slopes (Aiken and 
West 1991) showed that extent evaluation was a positive and significant predictor of 
regret in the deliberative condition, β = .21, p < .001. But the slope of extent 
evaluation was not significant in the natural condition, β = -.06, p > .14. Figure 2 
depicts the relationship between regret and participants’ extent evaluation across two 
conditions. This result is consistent with our conceptualization that people do not 
deliberate on consumption extent when they naturally evaluate regret but increasing 
the salience of extent mitigates this extent neglect because deliberative extent 
evaluation is perceived to be more diagnostic than bodily arousal.  
  
 37 
FIGURE 2: Consumption Regret is Sensitive to Consumption Extent  
Only When Extent is Made Salient (Study 2) 
 
 
We used the Johnson-Neyman technique (Johnson & Neyman, 1936) to 
identify the ranges of participants’ extent evaluation for which the simple effect of the 
evaluation mode was significant. This analysis revealed that there was a significant 
positive effect of the evaluation mode (coded 1 for the natural condition and 0 for the 
deliberative condition) on reported regret when extent rating was less than 3.15 (β 
=.28, SE = .14, p = .05). Combined with the pattern of extent neglect in the natural 
mode of evaluation, this result suggests that the discrepancy in the intensity of regret 
between the natural mode and the deliberative mode is driven largely by participants 
in the natural mode condition whose consumption amount is small or moderate. These 
participants experience unwarranted regret because they do not naturally take into 
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consideration the fact that their consumption extent is justifiably low and so they do 
not have to feel too regretful about their consumption.  
Confound Checks  
There was no effect of evaluation mode on participants’ mood (p > .56). The 
four involvement measures were highly correlated (α = .94) so we computed the mean 
of the four items to come up with a composite measure of involvement. There was no 
effect of evaluation mode on the composite measure of involvement (p > .81). 
 
Discussion 
  
This study directly shows that people do not deliberate on their consumption 
extent during the evaluation of consumption regret unless they are prompted to 
consider it. Replicating the result from the previous study, reported consumption 
regret was higher when it was evaluated in the natural mode than in the deliberative 
mode. Importantly, the pattern of extent sensitivity suggests that this discrepancy in 
the intensity of regret is driven largely by participants who perceive their consumption 
extent to be low: When the consumption extent was made salient, these participants 
evaluated their consumption regret to be accordingly low. However, when the extent 
was not made salient, these participants failed to adjust their consumption regret to be 
accordingly low because their evaluation was anchored largely by their affective 
reactions to the food items. These results suggest that extent neglect matters more for 
prudent consumers; it is the people who consume in moderation that evaluate their 
behavior more harshly than they should. 
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The pattern of results in the first two studies suggest that people neglect 
deliberative extent evaluation because it is not as salient as arousal. When the salient 
of deliberative extent evaluation is high, people attend less to arousal because extent 
evaluation is perceived to be more diagnostic than arousal. Study 3 and study 4 are 
designed to further investigate the role or salience and diagnosticity of these inputs in 
the experience of consumption regret. These studies show that subtle contextual cues 
that influence salience and diagnosticity of these inputs can influence how people 
experience consumption regret. The next two studies not only test the predictive value 
of the proposed theoretical framework but also illustrate the situational contingency of 
arousal and deliberative evaluation in the experience of regret.  
 
Study 3: Contextual Cues Can Increase the Salience of Consumption Extent  
 
In the previous two studies, we increased the salience of deliberative extent 
evaluation by directly asking participants to consider the extent of their consumption. 
Can contextual cues that increase the salience of extent evaluation reduce extent 
neglect? Using a procedure similar to that used by Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004), we 
primed the salience of affective arousal-based and deliberative extent-based 
evaluations. Participants were exposed to one of two different advertisements before 
evaluating their consumption regret; one primed them to do affective arousal-based 
evaluation whereas the other primed deliberative extent-based evaluation. We 
expected this priming to increase the salience of affective and deliberative evaluation 
respectively. Subsequently, they evaluated their consumption regret either in the 
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natural mode or the deliberative mode. We predicted that priming extent evaluation 
would increase the salience of extent evaluation and thus prevent extent neglect even 
when participants are not explicitly prompted to consider their consumption extent. 
Also, we predicted that the deliberative evaluation mode would reduce the effect of 
the arousal-based prime because of the higher diagnosticity of deliberative extent 
evaluation compared to affective evaluation. It should be noted that building on the 
findings from the previous studies, we use relatively higher intensity of regret as an 
indicator of arousal-based evaluation of regret and lower intensity of regret as an 
indicator of extent-based evaluation of regret.  
Additionally, instead of using infrequently consumed food categories as in our 
previous studies (e.g., cookies, cakes, ice cream etc.), we chose more frequently 
consumed food categories (burgers & pizzas, fried food, and desserts) to further 
establish generalizability and rule out the possibility that the patterns shown in the 
current research manifest only when narrow categories are considered and thus 
consumption quantities are very small.  
 
Method 
 
Participants and Design  
The experiment was administered as an internet-based study to participants 
recruited from an online panel. One hundred and ninety-two participants (99 women; 
average age: 33.6) completed the study for a small amount of money. The study used a 
2 (evaluation mode: natural vs. deliberative) x 2 (prime type: affect-based vs. extent-
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based) x 3 (food category replicate: burgers & pizzas, fried food, and desserts) mixed 
factorial experimental design with evaluation mode and prime type as between-
subjects factors and food category replicate as a within-subjects factor.  
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four between-subjects 
conditions created by crossing evaluation mode and prime type. Participants were told 
that they will be asked to complete several unrelated questionnaires. In the first part of 
the study, participants were told that they will be shown a poster that will be used for a 
campaign in the future and their task is to take a careful look at the poster to answer 
several questions later. On the following screen, all participants saw a poster. A 
hidden timer was added to the webpage so that participants had to spend at least 20 
seconds on the webpage before advancing to the next webpage. Participants in the 
affect-based prime condition were shown a poster with a slogan “Fat lasts longer than 
flavor” accompanied with an aversive picture of a thin person holding five pounds of 
body fat. Participants in the extent-based prime condition were shown a poster with a 
slogan “Let’s move!” accompanied with a picture of a healthy couple running. This 
slogan was adapted from the first lady Michelle Obama’s “Let’s move” campaign. 
Importantly, this poster provided information on the amount of calories that can be 
burned from 30 minutes of walking, running, and swimming to make extent salient, 
priming extent of behavior (see Appendix 3A for the stimuli).  
In an ostensibly unrelated survey on consumption of food items, participants 
were asked to evaluate how much they regret their consumption of food items in three 
categories (burgers & pizzas, fried food, and desserts). Before evaluating their regret, 
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participants in the deliberative evaluation condition were first asked to estimate, for 
each food category, how many calories they consume per month.  
Finally, as a manipulation check participants saw the poster they were shown 
earlier and indicated whether they consider the poster as being emotional in nature or 
using quantitative information (1: emotional – 7: quantitative). Participants also 
responded to the other confound check measures and demographic variables reported 
in the previous study. 
 
Results  
 
Two participants failed the instructional manipulation check and another 
participant was an outlier on response time; responses from these three participants 
were not included in the analysis. This data exclusion was done to reduce the effect of 
idiosyncratic participants. The results of analyses without the exclusion are provided 
in the Appendix 3B. 
Consumption Regret 
Reported regret was submitted to a 2 (evaluation mode: natural vs. 
deliberative) x 2 (prime type: affect based (body-fat poster) vs. extent based (calorie-
information poster)) x 3 (food category: burgers & pizzas, fried food, and desserts) 
mixed model ANCOVA with evaluation mode and prime type as between-subjects 
factors and food category as a within-subjects factor. Participants’ BMI was entered as 
a covariate in the model. There was a significant main effect of evaluation mode. 
Replicating the results from previous studies, reported regret was higher in the natural 
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mode condition than in the deliberative mode condition (Mnatural = 2.75, Mdeliberative = 
2.34), F(1, 184) = 7.66, p < .01. More important, there was a significant interaction of 
evaluation mode and prime type, F(1, 184) = 6.32, p = .01. We conducted planned 
contrast analyses to probe this interaction. When participants were primed with the 
calorie-information poster, there was no discrepancy between the regret intensity in 
the natural mode and in the deliberative mode, suggesting that priming extent 
evaluation mitigated extent neglect (Mnatural = 2.56, Mdeliberative = 2.52), F(1, 184) = 
0.03, p > .85. This result is consistent with our prediction that merely increasing the 
salience of extent evaluation without forcing participants to deliberate on their 
consumption extent will mitigate extent neglect. In contrast, when participants were 
primed with the affect-inducing body-fat poster, reported regret was higher in the 
natural mode than in the deliberative mode (Mnatural = 2.93, Mdeliberative = 2.15), F(1, 
184) = 14.17, p < .001. This result is consistent with our prediction that when both 
deliberative extent evaluation and affective evaluation are salient and accessible, the 
evaluation of regret would be largely informed by deliberative extent evaluation 
because it is perceived to be more diagnostic than affective evaluation. Figure 3 
graphically depicts the average intensity of regret in the four conditions. There was a 
main effect of food category, F(2, 370) = 10.99, p < .001, but there was no significant 
interaction between food category and other factors, ps > .18.   
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Figure 3: Priming Consumption Extent Reduces Extent Neglect (Study 3) 
 
 
Manipulation Check  
As expected, participants who saw the calorie-information poster rated the 
poster to be more quantitative (i.e., less emotional) than participants who saw the 
arousal-inducing fat-picture poster (Mcalories-poster = 5.98, Mbody-fat-poster = 3.39), F(1, 
184) = 133.70, p < .001. Evaluation mode did not influence the ratings of the posters, 
F(1, 184) = 0.40, p > .52. There was an unexpected interaction of prime type and 
evaluation mode on the perception of the posters, F(1, 184) = 4.21, p < .05; the ratings 
of the two posters were farther apart for participants in the extent salient condition 
who estimated their calorie consumption, (Mcalories-poster = 6.28, Mbody-fat-poster = 3.23), 
F(1, 184) = 91.24, p < .001, than those in the natural condition who did not estimate 
their calorie consumption (Mcalories-poster = 5.68, Mbody-fat-poster = 3.55), F(1, 184) = 
45.95, p < .001.  
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There was no effect of evaluation mode, prime type, or the interaction of the 
two on participants’ mood (ps > .23). The four involvement measures were highly 
correlated (α = .95) so we computed the mean of the four items to come up with a 
composite measure of involvement. There was no effect of evaluation mode, prime 
type, or the interaction of the two on the composite measure of involvement (p’s > 
.21). 
 
Discussion 
 
Participants in this study were exposed to one of two different advertising 
messages, one that primes affective evaluation or one that primes deliberative extent 
evaluation. Consistent with our account, priming extent to make it more salient 
mitigated the extent neglect. Furthermore, even when affective evaluation was primed, 
when participants were asked to deliberate on the extent of their consumption, the 
evaluated consumption regret was lower. These results again show that spontaneous 
affective reaction is more salient but deliberative extent evaluation is perceived to be 
more diagnostic. In our next study, we test whether we can increase the perceived 
diagnosticity of affective evaluation.  
 
Study 4: Contextual Cues Can Increase Diagnosticity of Affective Evaluation  
 
The studies thus far established two guiding principles of how affect and 
cognition interact in the experience of consumption regret: First, people naturally rely 
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on bodily arousal while neglecting deliberative extent evaluation because arousal is 
more salient than extent evaluation. Second, when the salience of extent evaluation is 
increased, people do rely on extent evaluation because it is perceived to be more 
diagnostic than arousal. In this study, we further explore the pivotal role of perceived 
diagnosticity in the interaction of affect and cognition in the experience of regret. Can 
contextual cues that increase the diagnosticity of arousal-driven affective evaluation 
make people rely on arousal and neglect consumption extent when both are salient?  
Although extent evaluation is generally considered more diagnostic than 
arousal-based affective evaluations, it is not the case that extent evaluation will always 
trump affective evaluation. Because perceived diagnosticity is a heuristic assessment, 
when contextual cues increase the perceived diagnosticity of affective evaluation, it 
can direct the focus of attention to affective evaluation. This study tests this prediction. 
We increased the diagnosticity of affective evaluation using contextual cues that 
highlight the unhealthiness of the food items considered for consumption regret 
evaluation. First, we induced negative arousal in all participants. Then, for half of the 
participants we increased the perceived diagnosticity of the negative arousal through 
contextual comparisons. 
 
Method 
 
Participants and Design 
The experiment was administered as an internet-based study to participants 
recruited from an online panel. Two hundred participants (113 women; average age: 
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33.9) completed the study for a small amount of money. The study used a 2 
(evaluation mode: natural vs. deliberative) x 2 (perceived diagnosticity of affective 
evaluation: low vs. high) x 3 (food category: burgers & pizzas, fried food, and 
desserts) mixed factorial experimental design with evaluation mode and perceived 
diagnosticity of affective evaluation as between-subjects factors and food category as 
a within-subjects factor.  
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four between-subjects 
conditions created by crossing evaluation mode and perceived diagnosticity of 
affective evaluation. To ensure that participants in all conditions are equally aroused, 
we presented all participants the same body-fat stimulus used in study 3. We then 
manipulated the perceived diagnosticity of this arousal. Half of the participants 
randomly assigned to the low perceived diagnosticity of affective evaluation condition 
reported how much they regret their consumption of unhealthy food items in three 
categories: burgers & pizzas, fried food, and desserts. The other half, assigned to the 
high perceived diagnosticity of affective evaluation condition, reported how much 
they regret their consumption of the unhealthy items as well as three healthy items: 
salads, fruits, and vegetables. We anticipated that direct comparisons of the 
evaluations of unhealthy items and the healthy items would make the arousal-based 
affective evaluation of these items to seem more diagnostic. This increased 
diagnosticity of affective evaluation, in turn, was predicted to make participants rely 
on arousal even when they deliberate on consumption extent and experience higher 
regret.   
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As in the previous study, extent salience was manipulated by asking 
participants to estimate consumption calories. Before evaluating their consumption 
regret, participants assigned to the deliberative evaluation condition were first asked to 
estimate, for each food category, how many calories they consume per month. 
Appendix 4A presents details of the stimuli used in this study. 
 
Results  
 
We excluded responses from twelve participants who failed the instructional 
manipulation check question at the end of the study. In addition, we excluded 
responses from one participant whose log-transformed completion time was more than 
three standard deviations away from the mean. Thus, the following results are based 
on the responses from remaining 187 participants. This data exclusion was done to 
reduce the effect of idiosyncratic participants. The results of analyses without the 
exclusion are provided in the Appendix 4B. 
Consumption Regret 
Reported regret was submitted to a 2 (evaluation mode: natural vs. 
deliberative) x 2 (perceived diagnosticity of affective evaluation: low vs. high) x 3 
(food category: burgers & pizzas, fried food, and desserts) mixed model ANCOVA 
with evaluation mode and perceived diagnosticity of affective evaluation as between-
subjects factors and food category as a within-subjects factor. Participants’ BMI was 
entered as a covariate in the model. There was a significant main effect of evaluation 
mode. Reported regret was higher in the natural mode than in the deliberative mode 
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(Mnatural = 3.02, Mdeliberative = 2.53), F(1, 182) = 9.84, p < .01. More important, there 
was a significant interaction of evaluation mode and perceived diagnosticity of 
affective evaluation, F(1, 182) = 4.79, p < .05. We conducted planned contrast 
analyses to probe this interaction. Replicating the results from study 3, when perceived 
diagnosticity of affective evaluation was low, regret reported in the natural mode was 
higher than regret reported in the deliberative mode (Mnatural-low = 3.10, Mdeliberative-low = 
2.27, F(1, 182) = 14.39, p < .001. However, regret reported in the natural mode and 
that in the deliberative mode were not different when the perceived diagnosticity of 
affective evaluation was high (Mnatural-high= 2.93, Mdeliberative-high= 2.79), F(1, 182) = 
0.44, p > .51. Figure 4 graphically depicts the pattern of reported regret in the four 
conditions. There was a main effect of food category, F(2, 366) = 32.77, p < .001, but 
there was no significant interaction between food category and other factors, ps > .51.   
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Figure 4: Increasing the Perceived Diagnosticity of Affective Evaluation Prevents 
Arousal Neglect Even When Consumption Extent is Salient (Study 4) 
 
 
Confound Checks  
There was an unexpected main effect of evaluation mode on participants’ 
mood (Mnatural = 5.40, Mdeliberative = 5.75), F(1, 182) = 6.46, p = .01, but controlling for 
mood did not change our main results. There was no main effect or interaction effect 
of perceived diagnosticity of affective evaluation on mood (ps > .40). The four 
involvement measures were highly correlated (α = .96) so we computed the mean of 
the four items to come up with a composite measure of involvement. There was no 
effect of evaluation mode, perceived diagnosticity of affective evaluation, or the 
interaction of the two on the composite measure of involvement (p’s > .59). 
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 In the previous experiment (study 3), we reduced extent neglect by increasing 
the salience of extent evaluation. In this study, we reduced arousal neglect when extent 
was salient by increasing the diagnosticity of affective evaluation. This study shows 
that, even when extent information is salient, increasing the perceived diagnosticity of 
affective evaluation can prevent arousal neglect. We first induced negative arousal in 
all participants. Then we asked some participants to evaluate both healthy and 
unhealthy food items to increase the perceived diagnosticity of arousal-based affective 
evaluation. The comparison of healthy and unhealthy food item validated the 
diagnostic value of their negative feelings. Other participants did not make this 
comparison. When the perceived diagnosticity of affective evaluation was high, 
consumption regret remained relatively high even when they were prompted to 
consider their consumption extent. This result is consistent with our account that 
perceived diagnosticity is a heuristic assessment of the necessity and the sufficiency of 
the informational input to make the judgment and contextual cues that influence the 
subjective assessment of diagnosticities of these evaluations can determine whether 
regret is informed by arousal or deliberation. 
 
General Discussion 
 
 This research challenges the characterization of regret as a cognitive construct 
that stems from higher order cognition and sheds light on the interaction of the affect 
and cognition in the experience of regret. Specifically, the results from four studies in 
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the context of consumption regret evaluation show that unless directed otherwise, 
there is a natural tendency to rely on spontaneous bodily arousal to evaluate 
consumption regret while not engaging in deliberative evaluation of consumption 
extent. The studies also show that because deliberative evaluation of consumption 
extent is perceived to be more diagnostic than arousal, when it is made salient, people 
do rely on the deliberative evaluation while relying less on arousal. Using skin 
conductance measures, study 1 directly shows that natural evaluation of consumption 
regret is influenced largely by spontaneous bodily arousal and that deliberating on 
consumption extent reduces attention to this arousal. Study 2 provides direct evidence 
that people attend to deliberative evaluation of consumption extent only when they are 
asked to. Study 3 and study 4 show that contextual cues can be used to manipulate the 
pattern of interaction of affective and cognitive inputs in the evaluation of 
consumption regret.  
Across studies, the intensity of experienced regret was higher when 
participants reported regret without deliberating on the extent of their consumption. 
The pattern of extent neglect in study 2 shows that the discrepancy is driven largely by 
participants who believe their consumption extent to be reasonably low. That is, while 
deliberative evaluation allows people who consume reasonably low quantities to 
evaluate their consumption regret to be accordingly low, failure to do so in the natural 
mode of evaluation causes consumption regret to be higher in this mode. These results 
suggest that at least for some consumers who have prudent eating habits, the 
consumption regret or food guilt they experience might be unwarranted because of the 
natural tendency to neglect consumption extent during the evaluation of consumption 
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regret. However, our conceptualization does not suggest that extent neglect will 
always mitigate consumption regret; in situations where consumption extent is 
unjustifiably high, regret evaluated after deliberating on consumption extent could be 
higher than naturally experienced consumption regret.  
In addition to contributing to the literature on regret, our research also 
contributes to the studies of the somatic marker hypothesis (Bechara and Damasio 
2005; Damasio 1994; 1996). Whereas majority of the studies testing the somatic 
marker hypothesis compared the behavior of brain lesion patients incapable of 
experiencing emotion and control participants who are capable of experiencing 
emotions, the current research extends the testing of the hypothesis using only the 
participants who are capable of experiencing emotions. Our results show that while 
emotions experienced in the body proper (arousal) can be used as an important input 
in the experience of conscious feeling (consumption regret), it is not always the case 
when there is another input that is perceived to be more diagnostic (deliberative 
evaluation of consumption extent) in the appraisal of the feeling.  
This research also provides some insight into the debate on the beneficial 
effects of consumption quantification. Some researchers observed beneficial impact of 
consumption quantification (Bassett et al. 2008; Burton et al. 2006; Dumanovsky, et 
al. 2010; Wisdom, Downs, Loewenstein 2010) whereas others didn’t (Downs, 
Loewenstein, Wisdom 2009; Elbel et al. 2009). Our results suggest that consumption 
quantification can sometimes reduce consumption regret and make the consumption 
seem justifiable. This is particularly true for infrequently considered items such as 
fried donuts and burgers. While people know that these items are unhealthy, bringing 
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to mind the consumption quantity (e.g., “I eat only once or twice a week”) can make 
the consumption seem justifiable and prevent behavior remediation. 
 The findings from the current research also have implications for advertising 
messages created to curb overconsumption. Some public service organizations and 
government agencies use affective, visceral stimuli to change consumption behaviors. 
Other agencies tend to use more deliberative messages; the “Let’s Move” 
advertisement that we used in study 4 was adapted from the former first lady Michelle 
Obama’s campaign. Our results suggest that because people neglect extent while 
evaluating their behaviors, visceral images are more likely to cause consumption 
regret and behavior remediation.   
While this paper focuses on evaluations of regrettable behaviors and how 
extent neglect could cause unwarranted negative emotional experiences, similar 
pattern of interaction between affect and cognition could also cause unwarranted 
positive emotional experiences in different contexts. Think of a dieter who evaluates 
her diet progress largely by focusing on whether she lost her weight rather than on 
how much weight she lost. Similarly, the dieter could evaluate her exercising behavior 
by focusing largely on whether she went to the gym rather than focusing on how much 
calories she burnt at the gym. Extent neglect in these contexts could cause 
unwarranted pride or satisfaction which could subsequently lead to unwarranted self-
rewarding or licensing. Similarly, evaluating how balanced a meal is by focusing on 
whether there are healthy food items on the plate without considering how much of the 
healthy items are on the plate could be harmful for one’s health. A student who 
evaluates his productivity largely by considering whether he spent some time sitting at 
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a desk rather than considering how much progress he’s made on his final paper might 
reward himself with unwarranted night out at a club. We believe that delineating the 
interplay of affective and cognitive aspects of different emotions could be a fruitful 
path for future research. 
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PAPER 2: ELECTRODERMAL RESPONSES TO MODE OF PAYMENT: 
THE SOMATIC MARKER HYPOTHESIS 
 
For the past several centuries, cash was the dominant form of payment. People 
used to carry currency bills and coins with them to pay for their transactions. In the 
last three decades, the form of payment has undergone a major transformation. Now a 
majority of retail transactions are carried out through card payments (Nilson Report 
2007). Although sellers and buyers both have welcomed the cashless economic 
environment, an emerging stream of research has identified an unintended 
consequence of cashless payments: it can increase spending. Results from several 
studies suggest that paying with credit card or debit card can increase spending 
compared to paying with cash (Hirschman 1979; Feinberg 1986; Prelec and Simester 
2001; Soman 2001; Raghubir and Srivastava 2008). Moreover, recent studies have 
qualified these results by showing that the propensity to overspend with credit card or 
debit card is more prominent for impulsive purchase decisions. Relative to card 
payments, cash payments decrease impulsive purchases of tempting but less healthy 
food items such as muffins, cookies, and French fries. For example, Just and Wansink 
(2014) found that schools that allowed students to use only cash payments to pay for 
their lunch had lower consumption of candies and higher consumption of fruits and 
vegetables compared to schools where card payments were accepted at the cafeteria. 
Soman (2003) analyzed the shopping baskets of people who had just completed their 
shopping and found that when shoppers paid in cash, their shopping baskets had a 
smaller proportion of treats/luxuries (e.g., chocolate, gum, snacks) relative to those 
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who paid using cards. Thomas, Desai, and Seenivasan (2011), in addition to finding 
the same pattern from their analysis of the real life shopping behavior of a large 
number of households, replicated these results in laboratory experiments by showing 
that participants’ shopping baskets had a smaller proportion of vice products when 
participants imagined paying using cash than when they imagined paying using credit 
card. The external validity of these findings is corroborated by an alarming correlation 
between the increase in obesity and the increase in the availability of plastic payments 
in the past two decades (Humphrey 2004; Ogden et al. 2006; Nilson Report 2007).  
Although the effect of mode of payment on impulse control is now well-
documented in the literature, the psychological mechanism underlying the effect 
remains relatively unclear. It is generally assumed that people spend more on debit or 
credit card because they have more money to spend and that they don’t monitor their 
spending carefully relative to when they spend cash. Several scholars have challenged 
this explanation and have argued that the actual psychological process entails changes 
in emotional responses. They have suggested that cash payments increase the “pain of 
paying” – a learned emotional response to parting with money (Prelec and 
Loewenstein 1998; Prelec and Simester 2001; Soman 2003; Raghubir and Srivastava 
2008; Rick, Cryder, and Loewenstein 2008; Thomas et al. 2011). Although, the 
assumption that cash payments can cause emotional responses that influence decisions 
is implicitly or explicitly endorsed by many scholars, this assumption has never been 
empirically tested. The first purpose of this research is to test this pivotal assumption 
about the role of emotional responses in mode of payment effects. Does mode of 
payment actually change emotional responses? Can these changes be measured using 
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physiological correlates of emotions that do not rely on self-reports? The second 
purpose is to explain how emotional responses evoked by cash payments influence 
purchase decisions. How does the proposed change in emotional state influence 
regulation of impulsive purchases? To explain the role of emotional responses in mode 
of payment effects, we bring together two distinct streams of literature, the literature 
on somatic markers (Damasio 1996; Bechara et al. 1999; Bechara, Tranel, and 
Damasio 2000; Tranel, Bechara, and Denburg 2002) and that on pain of paying (Prelec 
and Loewenstein 1998; Prelec and Simester 2001). The gist of our proposal is that 
pain of paying is a learned somatic marker of decision conflict and the activation of 
these somatic markers help regulate impulsive responses.  
To demonstrate the role of emotional responses in the impulse regulation effect 
of mode of payment using somatic marker hypothesis, we manipulate the mode of 
payment in a simulated shopping task and measure participants’ electrodermal activity 
(EDA) or skin conductance. We test whether mode of payment – cash versus card – 
changes participants’ EDA when they make shopping decisions. Furthermore, we also 
test whether the effect of mode of payment on EDA is contingent on the nature of the 
product being considered. To presage our results, we find that participants’ 
anticipatory EDA levels are higher in the cash payment condition than in the card 
payment condition and this effect is stronger under conditions of decision conflict 
when people considered tempting but unhealthy vice items. The results suggest that 
the EDA evoked by cash payments serves as a somatic marker that identifies decision 
conflict. By demonstrating the effect of payment mode on people’s bodily responses 
and the effect of the bodily responses on impulse regulation, our results show that 
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emotion plays a critical role in the mode of payment effect. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
 Somatic markers are bodily changes – such as heart rate, sweat gland activity, 
and facial expressions – that become associated with particular situations and their 
outcomes. These changes in body and brain states can be covert (unconscious) or overt 
(conscious), manifesting as emotional experiences. They play an important role in 
guiding judgment and decision-making. In the following sections, we will first review 
evidence from studies showing that somatic markers can influence decisions. Then we 
will characterize the role of somatic markers in the mode of payment effect to explain 
how the bodily response to cash payment curbs impulsive purchase.  
 
Somatic Markers Guide Decision Making 
 
  Neuroscientists proposed the somatic marker hypothesis to explain the 
paradoxical behaviors of patients with lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. 
These patients showed no signs of cognitive impairments; they performed well in 
intelligence tests, memory tests, and knowledge tests. Their basic attentional processes 
were intact. Yet they had difficulty in long-term planning and often made choices that 
resulted in financial or social losses. That is, despite retaining their cognitive 
functioning, patients with lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex lost the ability 
to make choices that maximized their long-term advantages. Damasio (1996) and 
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other researchers (Bechara et al. 1994) suggested that human reasoning and decision 
making are not only influenced by explicit knowledge represented as facts, rules, 
stories, and mental images, but also by innate knowledge represented as emotional 
experiences, somatic markers, and action propensities. As noted previously, emotional 
experiences are accompanied by changes in bodily states – such as heart rate, sweat 
gland activity, and facial expressions – that these neuroscientists referred to as somatic 
markers of the emotional state. Although brain lesions do not impair cognitive 
functions and explicit knowledge, these lesions can prevent people from experiencing 
the activation of somatic markers that guide decision makers through conflicting 
choices. These are some of the basic assumptions underlying the somatic marker 
hypothesis. 
Empirical evidence for the claim that somatic markers guide decision-making 
comes from the studies examining the performance of patients with brain lesions in the 
Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al. 1994). In Iowa Gambling Task, participants – 
normal people and those with brain lesions – are asked to draw cards from four decks 
of cards that could either lead to gain or loss. Participants earn a reward after each 
draw. However, some of the draws also come with a penalty. Participants are given the 
goal of maximizing their profits by choosing cards judiciously from the four decks, 
one card at a time from any deck of their choice. Unbeknownst to the participants, two 
of the decks are designed to offer high immediate gains but larger future losses, while 
the other two decks are designed to offer lower immediate gains but smaller future 
losses. Specifically, each draw from deck A or deck B yields $100 whereas each draw 
from deck C or deck D yields $50. Thus, deck A and B offer larger immediate gains. 
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However, the cards in deck A and B also come with larger penalties than cards in deck 
C and deck D: ten draws from deck A or B incurs penalty of $1250 while ten draws 
from deck C or D incurs penalty of only $250. Thus, on average in the long run, a 
draw from deck A or B incurs a net loss of $25 while a draw from deck C or D yields 
a net gain of $25. In the early stages of the gambling task, participants tend to choose 
more cards from the decks A or B that offers high immediate gains but larger future 
losses. However, over time they learn the implicit rule that it is more advantageous to 
switch to the decks C or D that provides lower immediate gain but smaller future loss. 
The results from a series of studies show that while normal control participants 
switched to the advantageous decks that maximize their long-term gains, participants 
with brain lesions failed to make the switch to the advantageous decks and ended up 
performing poorly in the gambling task. Such disadvantageous decision-making by the 
patients with brain damage in the Iowa Gambling Task has been attributed to the 
absence of somatic marker activation in the anticipation and experience of 
disadvantageous outcomes (Damasio 1996; Bechara et al. 1999; Bechara et al. 2000; 
Tranel et al. 2002).  
The analysis of the skin conductance activity during the participation in Iowa 
Gambling Task showed that the absence of anticipatory skin conductance response 
was a marker of disadvantageous decisions. Skin conductance response varies with the 
activation levels of the sweat glands on the skin. Sweat glands are activated by the 
sympathetic nervous system, and greater sweating which manifests as higher skin 
conductance is an indication of greater arousal (Bouscein 1992; Dawson, Schell, 
Filion 2007). After playing a few rounds of the game, normal participants began to 
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show higher skin conductance response whenever they considered making a selection 
from a bad deck (deck A or deck B). However, there were no such skin conductance 
response spikes when they were about to draw a card from a good deck (deck C or 
deck D). This suggests that somatic markers identify conflicting decisions, in this case, 
the conflict between larger immediate gain and larger potential loss, that call for 
caution and vigilance. More importantly, for patients with brain lesions, bad decks did 
not trigger higher skin conductance (Bechara et al. 1999; Tranel et al. 2002). The 
absence of somatic markers among the patients with brain lesions prevented them 
from identifying and avoiding the disadvantageous decks of cards. Results from these 
studies suggest that somatic markers or bodily signals play an important role in 
identifying disadvantageous decisions. Furthermore, somatic markers seem to operate 
by identifying situations that are characterized by decision conflict. 
 
Somatic Markers and Mode of Payment 
 
 We propose that somatic markers play a role in the mode of payment effect. 
Much like the way the learned negativity of a bad deck activated somatic markers in 
the participants of Bechara et al.’s (1999) and Tranel et al.’s (2002) Iowa Gambling 
studies, learned negativity of cash payment can also activates somatic markers in 
consumers. Parting with cash is usually a painful experience. During the process of 
socialization, even as children, people learn to conserve their wealth. They develop an 
autonomic response to identify situations that might result in a loss of wealth. Because 
of this learned response, even the imagery of opening one’s wallet and giving out 
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one’s hard earned cash can evoke an autonomic visceral response. As noted 
previously, this emotional response to parting with money has been referred to as the 
pain of paying (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998; Prelec and Simester 2001; Soman 2001; 
Raghubir and Srivastava 2008; Rick, Cryder, and Loewenstein 2008). The extant 
research suggests that the pain of paying with cash payments is stronger than the pain 
of paying with card because card payments are more abstract and less concrete. In the 
case of card payments, the mental coupling between the mode of payment and the 
experienced pain is relatively weak presumably because the depletion of the wealth 
happens in a distant bank account at a distant point in time. Therefore, people do not 
experience the same visceral response when they pay using cards. The primary 
objective of the present research is to test the hypothesis that the pain of paying serves 
as a somatic marker and will therefore manifest as an increase in EDA when people 
make purchasing decisions. We hypothesize that while making purchasing decisions, 
those paying with cash would experience a higher spike in the EDA relative to those 
paying with more abstract form of payment such as credit card.  
 
The Role of Decision Conflict 
 
The activation of somatic markers is a learned bodily reaction that guides 
people to advantageous decision making that is more likely to be prominent when the 
decision process introduces decision conflict. This was the case in the studies by 
Bechara et al. (1999) and Tranel et al. (2002) wherein normal participants without 
brain lesions experienced stronger anticipatory skin conductance reaction towards the 
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decks that introduced a decision conflict between short-term gain and long-term loss 
(decks A & B). There was no such skin conductance reaction towards decks that did 
not pose such conflict (decks C & D). Extending this idea to the context of purchase 
decisions, somatic marker activation is more likely to be prominent when people 
consider purchases that are characterized by conflicting feelings of desirability on the 
one had (“go” signals) and anticipated regret and guilt on the other hand (“stop” 
signals). For example, when a shopper reaches out to buy a gallon of her regular brand 
of milk, or when she picks up a pack of her usual laundry detergent, it will not activate 
somatic markers because the purchase decision does not evoke conflicting responses. 
However, when she encounters a product that elicits conflicting responses – for 
example, when she is considering the purchase of a family pack of sugar laden cookies 
or ordering a side of fat laden French fries – she is likely to vacillate in her decision 
making. The somatic marker hypothesis suggests that the activation of somatic 
markers is more likely when consumers consider such vice items that introduce the 
conflict between short-term pleasure and long-term negative effects on health. 
Furthermore, somatic marker hypothesis suggests that the activated somatic markers, 
as they guided the participants in Iowa Gambling task to make more sound decisions 
in the long run by avoiding the risky decks, will guide consumers to make more 
advantageous decisions by giving up the short-term pleasure of cookies or French fries 
for the sake of long term health benefit. Thus, we predict the somatic marker 
activation induced by cash payments, measured with the level of EDA, to be more 
pronounced for vice food products that elicit decision conflict than for virtue food 
products. Furthermore, as the activation of somatic markers is a learned bodily 
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reaction guiding people to make advantageous decisions, reliance on the activated 
somatic markers should also be more pronounced in the presence of decision conflict. 
Therefore, we predict the impulse controlling effect of EDA on purchase decision to 
be stronger for vice food products than for virtue food products. We hypothesize that 
the effect of mode of payment on EDA is stronger for vice products that elicit greater 
decision conflict and that the effect of EDA on purchase decision is stronger for 
products that elicit greater decision conflict.   
To test these hypotheses, we designed a simulated shopping task following the 
procedure used in prior studies. Our experiment aims to replicate the mode of payment 
effect and tests the proposed role of somatic markers by examining participants’ EDA 
activity during the shopping task.  
 
Methodological Considerations 
 
Before we proceed to describe the experiment, it might be useful to alert the 
readers to a couple of methodological challenges in using EDA data. First, there is the 
question whether somatic markers should be measured by tracking skin conductance 
response (SCR) or overall EDA level. SCR includes only the phasic change in EDA 
(i.e., deviations from the baseline EDA for each participant). Overall EDA level, in 
contrast, includes the tonic as well as phasic level of skin conductivity of the skin. 
Both of these measures have been used in the extant literature as a measure of skin 
conductance reactivity. Changes in overall EDA level are relatively larger and easier 
to detect (1 to 3 microseimens) whereas changes in SCR are much smaller and more 
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difficult to detect (0.1 to 1 microseimens). Furthermore, since SCRs take around three 
seconds to reach its peak amplitude, it is almost impossible to use SCR for decisions 
that take less than three seconds (see Dawson, Schell, Filion 2007 for a detailed 
discussion on these aspects of EDA data). Because of these considerations, we decided 
to use overall EDA level rather than SCR. This approach is consistent with the 
approach in several studies on judgment and decision making (Aaker, Stayman, and 
Hagerty 1986; Groeppel-Klein 2005; Ohme et al. 2009).  
Second, there is considerable heterogeneity in participants’ EDA reaction to 
different products. A given product does not elicit the same arousal in all participants; 
there is considerable variance across products and individuals. To overcome this issue, 
we use a repeated-measurement design wherein we use several replicates in each 
product category and then aggregate the EDA measures across these replicates to test 
which category elicits higher EDA. The idea is that when we measure EDA across 
multiple replicates in each category, we can compare the differences in EDA caused 
by category effects after controlling for the idiosyncratic effects of the products. In 
addition, since the different food items are presented in a random order, it should also 
be noted that relatively large variances in EDA are caused by the differences in the 
order of presentation or habituation effect (can be as high as 5 microseimens). 
Compared to the habituation effect, the effect of category is likely to be very small 
(around 1 microseimens). Therefore, the modeling challenge is to estimate the effect 
of the category after controlling for individual-level heterogeneity in the ordering (i.e., 
habituation) effect of the shopping items presented. We adopted a mixed-effect 
modeling approach, treating habituation as a random effect, to address this issue. 
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Experiment 
 
This experiment was designed to demonstrate the role of somatic markers in 
the mode of payment effect. Participants were asked to respond to a simulated 
shopping task. Somatic marker activation was tracked by measuring participants’ EDA 
during the shopping task. The experiment used a 2 x 2 mixed factorial design: mode of 
payment (card vs. cash) was manipulated between participants and type of products 
(vice vs. virtue) was manipulated within participants. There were 15 replicates of vice 
as well as virtue products. Additionally, we also measured participants’ self-reported 
dietary restraint goals using a validated scale (van Strien et al. 1986) to examine how 
diet control goals influenced shopping decisions and EDA.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
One hundred and four students from a US university (65% female, average age 
20.7) participated in this experiment and were paid $5 for their participation.  
Apparatus 
The experiment was administered on a desktop computer using Macromedia 
Authorware software. EDA (in microSeimens; μS) was measured using BIOPAC 
System’s Bionomadix device that uses a 0.5 V constant voltage excitation and 
recorded using the AcqKnowledge software. After each participant completed the 
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study, the research assistants saved the participant’s EDA data, which was later 
merged with the output file from Macromedia Authorware used to collect participants’ 
self-reported responses.  
Procedure 
The experiment was administered to one participant at a time (over a period of 
20 days) by three trained research assistants in a small room equipped with a one-way 
mirror. The one-way mirror enabled the research assistants to observe the participants 
without being present in the room. When participants reported to the lab, they were 
seated before a computer and informed that they would have to respond to a computer-
based shopping study. Further, they were told that the researchers are interested in 
measuring their skin conductance levels during the study. At this point, the research 
assistants helped the participants put on the EDA measurement device on their non-
dominant hand (so that they could freely use their dominant hand to operate the 
mouse). All participants indicated they use their right hand to operate the mouse so 
they put on the EDA measurement device on their left hand. Two silver-silver chloride 
electrodes (Ag-AgCl) pre-gelled with isotonic gel by the manufacturer were attached 
to the thenar and hypothenar eminences of the participant’s palm (Dawson et al. 
2007). The research assistants ensured that participants’ palms were clean and dry 
before putting on the sensors. Furthermore, the participants were told that the sensors 
should remain on their palms during the entire course of the study. Right before the 
participants’ started responding to the task, the research assistants exited the room and 
observed the participants’ through the one way mirror. The main task – shopping 
decisions – was preceded by a stabilization phase. 
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Stabilization Phase 
It takes some time for participants to get used to the sensors attached to their 
palms. Additionally, EDA takes some time to stabilize. To allow for these stabilization 
processes, after the sensors were attached to the participants’ palms, they were asked 
to wait for a minute and complete some tasks that are unrelated to the study. During 
this phase, participants were shown 36 dictionary words and artificial non-words, and 
were asked to read aloud each of them and rate how easy or difficult it is to pronounce 
it. On average, this task took around 6 minutes.  
Shopping Study 
The shopping study commenced after the stabilization phase. The shopping 
study was presented in the guise of a market research study. Participants read that a 
large retail chain is considering opening a store in their city and wants to study the 
residents’ food preferences. The manipulation was administered before they started the 
shopping. The computer randomly assigned participants into either the card condition 
or the cash condition. Those assigned to the card condition saw a picture with the logo 
of four popular cards accompanied by the statement: “The store accepts all major 
credit and debit cards.” Those assigned to the cash condition saw a picture of dollar 
bills and were informed that the store accepts cash payments only. The two screens are 
depicted in Appendix 5. These screens remained on the computer for 60 seconds in the 
respective conditions. Thereafter, all participants saw 30 food items – 15 vice and 15 
virtue – one at a time. The vice and virtue products were interspersed and the order of 
presentation of the 30 products was randomized by the computer for each participant. 
For each product, the participants saw on the screen a picture of the product, its name 
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and price. They had to indicate their purchase decision for that product by clicking on 
one of the two buttons – “Add to Shopping Cart” or “Continue Shopping.” Appendix 
6 depicts some examples. The average of EDA level measured while participants were 
making their purchase decision for each product was later used for the analyses of how 
payment mode and type of product influenced EDA and how EDA subsequently 
influenced purchase decision. Each product was separated from the subsequent 
product by a blank screen with a “Continue” button at the center of the screen (see 
Appendix 6). Participants proceeded to the next product by clicking on the continue 
button; thus, the experiment was self-paced. Participants took an average of 2.04 
seconds to make each purchasing decision.  
Stimuli 
The 30 products used as stimuli in the study were selected based on a pretest. 
Appendix 7 lists the vice and virtue products used in the experiment. Note that the 
vice products were rated to be more impulsive but less healthy than virtue products. 
Therefore, these products were expected to elicit greater decision conflict. 
Attention to Price 
Immediately after the simulated shopping task, participants were asked to 
estimate from memory how many items they added to the shopping cart and the total 
expense incurred in shopping. They typed in these estimates in separate text boxes on 
the screen. Since the participants could not go back to the previous screens, they had 
to estimate these measures from their memory. The accuracy of the estimated 
spending is used a measure of attention to the price of the product during the shopping 
task.  
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Manipulation Checks 
Then participants were asked to recall which mode of payment the store 
accepts. They submitted their response by clicking on one of the two options – “cash 
only” or “card payments.” Additionally, to measure participants’ feeling associated 
with their spending, participants were asked to indicate how they felt about spending 
money on the shopping trip. Specifically, they read the following instruction: “A 
store's payment policy can influence how consumers feel on a shopping trip. How did 
you feel about spending money on this shopping trip?” Participants indicated their 
response on a 5-point unnumbered feelings scale which was anchored with the 
emoticon  on the left-end and the emoticon  on the right-end. The responses were 
coded such that higher scores on this scale indicate more negative feeling (i.e., greater 
pain of payment). 
Healthfulness 
Participants were asked to rate each of the 30 items on the perceived 
healthfulness of the product on a five-point scale anchored at -2 = “Unhealthy” and +2 
= “Healthy.”  
Restrained Eating Scale 
Then, participants completed the 10 item restrained eating scale (van Strien et 
al. 1986) to test whether the activation of somatic markers measured by EDA would 
be more pronounced for participants who are restrained eaters who presumably 
experience more decision conflict when deciding whether to purchase food items. This 
scale included questions such as “Do you try to eat less at mealtimes than you would 
like to eat?” and “Do you watch exactly what you eat?” Finally, they answered 
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questions about their frequency of consumption and demographic variables. 
 
Results 
 
Response Exclusion 
During the analyses of the EDA data, it was observed that data from four 
participants were not recorded probably because the sensors were accidentally 
detached from their palms during the experiment. Therefore, the analyses are based on 
the responses from 100 participants. 
Manipulation Checks 
All participants cleared the manipulation check. Specifically, all participants in 
the cash condition correctly recalled at the end of the study that the store accepted cash 
payments only whereas all those in the card payment condition recalled that the store 
accepted all types of cards. Additionally, a one-way ANOVA revealed that 
participants in the cash condition had a more negative feeling (i.e., greater pain of 
payment) about spending money (Mcash = 3.06 vs. Mcard = 2.08; F(1, 98) = 23.74, p < 
.01). This result is consistent with our conceptualization. 
EDA during Purchase Decisions 
Participants’ EDA was regressed on two main factors and their interaction 
terms: type of product and mode of payment. We applied a log transformation to the 
dependent variable given its distribution is right-skewed and has a positive support. To 
control for the differences in the order in which the food items were presented to each 
participant and the different rate at which each participant habituated during the 
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shopping task, we specified the order of presentation (t) as a random effect in the 
model after log-transforming the variable, in accordance to the log-transformation of 
the dependent variable. Using the lmer command (lmer4 package) in R, we estimated 
the following random-effects model: 
 
log(𝐸𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑉𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖 ⋅ 𝑉𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 log(𝑡𝑖) + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
 
for participant i and shopping occasion t. The results are summarized in Table 
1. The simple effect of type of mode of payment (Cash Payment) was significant, β = 
.070, p < .05, and the sign of the coefficient suggests that relative to participants in the 
card condition, participants in the cash condition experienced higher EDA during the 
shopping task. Furthermore, the two-way interaction between mode of payment (Cash 
Payment) and type of product (Vice Product) was significant, β = .042, p < .05, 
suggesting that the effect of cash payment that increases EDA relative to card payment 
during the shopping task was more pronounced for the vice products than for the 
virtue products. These results are consistent with our hypotheses that paying with cash 
(compared to paying with card) induces stronger visceral reactions, measured with 
anticipatory EDA, during purchasing decisions and this effect of mode of payment on 
EDA is stronger for vice products that elicit greater decision conflict. Figure 5 depicts 
the pattern of EDA as a function of mode of payment and food type. 
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Table 1: Paying with Cash (instead of Card) Increases Anticipatory EDA 
during the Shopping Task and this Effect is Stronger for Vice Products 
 logEDA logEDA 
b t-value p-value b t-value p-value 
Intercept 
 
1.373       56.868       < .001 1.359 56.596   < .001 
Vice Product 
 
-.020 -1.340    .180 -.024 -1.622  .105 
Cash Payment 
 
.070    2.063    .039 .099 2.938   .003 
Vice Product 
x Cash Payment 
 
.042 1.984    .047 .047 2.235   .025 
Restrained Eating 
 
   .122 6.841  < .001 
Vice Product x 
Restrained Eating  
 
   .007 .586   .558 
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Figure 5: Paying with Cash (instead of Card) Increases Anticipatory EDA during the 
Shopping Task and this Effect is Stronger for Vice Products 
 
 
Furthermore, we conducted additional specifications of the model by including 
participants’ restrained eating score and its interaction with food type as covariates. 
These results are also summarized in Table 1. Again, the simple effect of mode of 
payment (Cash Payment) was significant, β = .099, p < .01, and also the two-way 
interaction between mode of payment (Cash Payment) and type of product (Vice 
Product) was significant, β = .047, p < .05, suggesting that the key results were robust 
even after controlling for participants’ restrained eating score. The result also shows 
that the higher the restrained eating score, the higher the EDA, β = .122, p < .01, 
suggesting that restrained eaters who presumably face more conflict when making 
1.2
1.25
1.3
1.35
1.4
1.45
1.5
1.55
Vice Product (Impulsive
Decisions)
Virtue Products (Deliberative
Decisions)
lo
g
E
D
A
Cash Payments Card Payments
 81 
food purchase decisions experienced higher activation levels of somatic markers.  
Purchase Decision 
When participants added a product to the shopping cart, the response was 
coded as 1 and when they did not do so the response was coded as 0. Again, this 
binary variable was regressed on two main factors and their interaction terms: type of 
product and mode of payment. To control for individual heterogeneity in baseline 
purchase propensity, we use the glmer command (lme4 package) in R to estimate a 
random-intercept logistic regression. The results are summarized in Table 2. The 
simple effect of type of product (Vice Product) was significant, β = -1.426, p < .01, 
and the sign of the coefficient suggests that relative to virtue products, participants 
were less likely to purchase vice products. More importantly, the two-way interaction 
between mode of payment (Cash Payment) and type of product (Vice Product) was 
significant, β = -.375, p < .05, suggesting that cash payment, compared to card 
payment, reduced the propensity to buy vice products. This result is consistent with 
our conceptualization and replicates the findings from previous research (Soman 2003; 
Thomas et al. 2011; Just and Wansink 2014).  
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Table 2: Paying with Cash (instead of Card) Decreases the Likelihood of Purchasing 
Vice Products during the Shopping Task 
 Purchase Decision (1) Purchase Decision (2) 
b z-value p-value b z-value p-value 
Intercept 
 
.237 2.081 .038 .208 1.820 .069 
Vice Product 
 
-1.426 -12.045 < .001 -1.378 -11.571 < .001 
Cash Payment 
 
-.024 -.150 .881 .041 .253 .800 
Vice Product 
x Cash Payment 
 
-.375 -2.203 .028 -.490 -2.834 .005 
Restrained Eating 
 
   .279 3.256 .001 
Vice Product x 
Restrained Eating 
 
   -.437 -4.703 < .001 
 
Participants in the card conditions purchased 30% more vice products than 
participants in the cash condition, p < .05. However, there was no difference in the 
odds ratio between the card condition and the cash condition for virtue products. To 
further corroborate this interaction, we computed the total value of vice and virtue 
products included in each shopping basket and examined how these values changed 
across cash and card conditions (see Figure 6). The total value of vice products 
included in their shopping cart was lower when participants were in the cash condition 
than in the card condition (Mcash = $8.79 vs. Mcard = $12.61, F(1, 95) = 4.76, p < .05). 
However mode of payment did not change the value of virtue products in the basket, 
(Mcash = $20.83 vs. Mcard = $21.49, F(1, 95) = 0.14, p > .70). 
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Figure 6: Paying with Cash (instead of Card) Decreases the Amount Spent on Vice 
Products 
 
 
 
Furthermore, we conducted additional specifications of the model by including 
participants’ restrained eating score and its interaction with food type as covariates. 
These results are also summarized in Table 2. Again, the simple effect of type of 
product (Vice Product) was significant, β = -1.378, p < .01, suggesting that 
participants were less likely to purchase vice products. Also, the two-way interaction 
between mode of payment (Cash Payment) and type of product (Vice Product) was 
significant, β = -.490, p < .01, suggesting that cash payment, compared to card 
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participants to purchase vice products. 
Effect of EDA on Purchase Decision 
To understand the effect of EDA on each purchase decision, the binary 
variable indicating whether participants purchased the product or not was regressed on 
log-transformed average EDA level measure during the purchase decision of the 
product, type of product, and the interaction of the two variables. The results are 
summarized in Table 3. There was a significant interaction of log-transformed EDA 
and type of product (Vice Product), β = -.234, p < .05, suggesting that the higher the 
EDA, the less likely it is for participants to purchase vice products. This result is 
consistent with our conceptualization (and Bechara et al.’s (1999) and Tranel et al.’s 
(2002) findings) that EDA is a somatic marker that guides people to make 
advantageous decisions under conditions of decision conflict. An increase in EDA did 
not affect the purchase of virtue products; it only affected the purchase of vice 
products that evoke decision conflict. 
 
Table 3: The Higher the EDA, the Lower the Purchase Likelihood of Vice Products 
 Purchase Decision 
b z-value p-value 
Intercept 
 
.108      .705    .481 
logEDA 
 
.090        .897    .370 
Vice Product 
x logEDA 
 
-.234 -2.126 .034 
Vice Product -1.309     -7.990  < .001 
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Healthfulness Ratings 
Participants’ healthfulness ratings of the 30 products were regressed on two 
factors and their interaction term: type of product, mode of payment. Only the simple 
effect of type of product was significant at conventional levels, β = -3.06, p < .01. 
Predictably, participants considered vice products as less healthy. More importantly, 
the perceived healthfulness of neither vice products (Mcash = -1.66 vs. Mcard = -1.61, 
F(1, 98) = 1.48, p > .22), nor virtue products was affected by mode of payment (Mcash 
= 1.38 vs. Mcard = 1.40, F(1, 98) = .29, p > .58). Thus, mode of payment did not 
influence cognitive evaluations of products. 
Attention to Price 
To rule out the possibility that the effect of mode of payment was caused by 
inattention to price in the card payment condition, we examined participants’ estimates 
of shopping basket. Table 4 lists the actual number of the items and values of items in 
the shopping basket along with participants’ estimates. As is evident, participants in 
both conditions were quite accurate in recalling the total value of the products that 
they shopped. We computed the difference between estimated amounts and the actual 
amounts (which served as a measures of recall accuracy) and submitted it to a one-
way ANOVA with mode of payment as the predictor. Mode of payment neither 
affected recall accuracy of the number of items (p > .40) nor the accuracy of the value 
of items included in the shopping basket (p > .51). These results suggest that the 
observed effect of mode of payment cannot be attributed to inattention to prices. 
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Table 4: Mode of Payment Did Not Influence Participants’ Attention to Price during 
the Shopping Task 
 Card Payments Cash Payments 
 Actual Estimate Actual Estimate 
No. of Items 
Purchased 
12.06 10.02 11.08 9.37 
Value of Items $34.10 $35.56 $29.62 $31.82 
 
 
General Discussion 
 
The current research contributes to the literature on mode of payment by 
demonstrating the role of bodily responses in explaining the impulse control effect of 
cash payment. We bring together the literature on somatic markers (Damasio 1996; 
Bechara et al. 1999; Bechara, Tranel, and Damasio 2000; Tranel, Bechara, and 
Denburg 2002) and that on pain of paying (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998; Prelec and 
Simester 2001) to characterize the role of anticipatory somatic response in everyday 
purchase decisions. By examining participants’ anticipatory EDA during a shopping 
task we shed light on factors that influence the activation of somatic markers and the 
role of somatic markers in shopping decisions. Specifically, we show that i) cash 
payment, which is considered more painful than card payment, triggers stronger 
anticipatory somatic marker activation, ii) the effect of mode of payment on somatic 
marker activation is more pronounced for vice products that evoke decision conflicts, 
and iii) somatic markers play an important role in impulse control, helping consumers 
to regulate impulsive purchase decisions. 
Importantly, these results show that the effect of mode of payment on 
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impulsive purchases cannot be attributed to a simple attentional account. People 
generally assume that card payments trigger more spending because of 
“mindlessness.” More specifically, it is assumed that because credit cards offer an 
almost limitless supply of money, shoppers do not bother to keep track of the prices 
and therefore spend more on discretionary products. Per this account, if shoppers 
become “mindful” they can easily override the effect of mode of payment on their 
shopping decisions. The present set of results challenge this view and suggests that the 
effect of mode of payment is caused by a more deep seated psychological process. 
Mode of payment can modulate the somatic markers of decision conflict. And it is this 
modulation that influences impulse regulation. Therefore, even if people pay close 
attention to the price of the product while shopping, when they are paying with card, 
the prepotency of somatic markers would be lower, thus reducing their ability to 
identify decision conflict. This will make them more susceptible to impulsive urges. 
The French philosopher Descartes postulated that the nonmaterial mind 
controls the material body; the mind regulates the acts of passion that emanate from 
the body. Contrary to Descartes’ postulation of the dualism between body and mind, 
other philosophers, notably Spinoza, have suggested that the human brain relies on 
bodily signals to identify situations that require vigilance and caution. Thus, 
advantageous and rational decision making relies on bodily cues such as quickening of 
heart beat and sweating of palms. This was first demonstrated by Bechara et al. (1999) 
who showed that normal human beings rely on somatic markers to identify responses 
that can lead to adverse consequences in the long run. These researchers identified 
biological impairment, specifically brain lesions, as a determinant of the prepotency of 
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somatic markers. In this research, we extend Bechara et al.’s work in an important 
way. We show that not only biological impairments such a brain lesions, even 
mundane contextual factors such as mode of payment can modulate the intensity of 
somatic markers. This demonstration, that something as mundane as mode of payment 
can modulate the intensity of somatic markers, substantially extends the scope of the 
somatic marker hypothesis.  
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APPENDIX  
 
Appendix 1A. Affectiva’s Skin Conductance Measurement Device 
 
All participants in Study 1 wore Affectiva’s skin conductance measurement device 
while answering a questionnaire on the computer screen. More details about the 
apparatus are available on the product website: http://qsensor-support.affectiva.com/ 
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Appendix 1B. Procedure for Study 1 (Paper 1) 
 
All participants first saw this initialization screen. Initialization screen is where 
baseline skin conductance (EDA) was measured. 
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Appendix 1B. Procedure for Study 1 (Paper 1) (continued) 
 
DAILY & ANNUAL DELIBERATIVE CONDITIONS 
Participants assigned to the daily [annual] deliberation condition read the following 
instructions. 
 
On the following screens, you will see several food categories, one at a time. 
For each food category, please indicate how many servings you consume per 
day [per year]. One serving for each category is the quantity of food suitable 
for or served to one person on one serving occasion. The serving size is often 
provided on the label. If you are not aware of the serving size for a food 
category, you can make an estimate based on common sense. For example, it 
is reasonable to assume that 1 can of soda is 1 serving size. 
 
Just enter a number indicating the number of servings that you consume per 
day [per year]. If you do not consume this category at all just enter 0. Please 
do not enter text or other symbols in the response field. 
 
Then they submitted the daily [annual] consumption rate for each food item. Each 
food item was presented on a separate screen and participants submitted their 
responses using an open-ended text box. Then they reported the consumption regret 
(see below). 
 
NATURAL EVALUATION CONDITION 
Participants assigned to the natural condition were not asked submit their consumption 
rates. They directly reported their consumption regret (see below). 
 
 
CONSUMPTION REGRET 
All participants then saw the following screen, explaining to them the main dependent 
variable. 
 
People often have conflicting feelings about food they consume. On the one 
hand, they enjoy consuming food that they crave; so they want to consume 
more of it. On the other hand, they regret consuming too much of it because 
it might be unhealthy in the long run.  
 
For each food item shown on the following screens, consider your 
consumption rates and indicate how regretful you feel about your 
consumption. You have to indicate the intensity of your regret using the given 
scale. 
 
Then they saw the nine food items, each item on separate screen. Participants 
indicated their consumption regret for each item on a 5-point scale wherein 1= “no 
regret at all” and 5= “very strong regret.”  
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Appendix 1B. Procedure for Study 1 (Paper 1) (continued) 
 
OTHER MEASURES 
All participants reported their gender, age, and dominant hand. 
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Appendix 2A. Procedure for Study 2 (Paper 1) 
 
Participants assigned to the weekly extent deliberation condition first estimated and 
evaluated their consumption extent then reported their consumption regret. On the 
other hand, participants assigned to the natural condition first reported their 
consumption regret then estimated and evaluated their consumption extent. 
 
CONSUMPTION EXTENT ESTIMATION AND EVALUATION 
Participants read the following instructions.  
 
WEEKLY CALORIE CONSUMPTION 
On the following, you will see several food categories. You have to indicate 
how many calories from that particular food category you consume per week. 
There are no correct or incorrect responses for these questions. We are 
interested in your truthful estimates.  
 
On the following screen, they read the following instructions. 
 
For each food category shown below, please indicate how many calories you 
consume per week. Just enter a number indicating the number of calories that 
you consume per week. Please do not enter text or other symbols in the 
response field. 
 
Then they saw the six food items, all on the same screen, and submitted the weekly 
calorie consumption amount for each food item using an open-ended text box. 
 
For each category, please indicate whether you think your consumption 
amount is low or high. 
 
Participants subjectively evaluated their consumption extent for each item on a 5-point 
scale wherein 1= “Low” and 5= “High.”  
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Appendix 2A. Procedure for Study 2 (Paper 1) (continued) 
 
CONSUMPTION REGRET 
All participants then saw the following screen, explaining to them the main dependent 
variable. The instruction for the participants assigned to the deliberation condition 
included an additional sentence contained in the square bracket below. 
 
People often have conflicting feelings about food they consume. On the one 
hand, they enjoy consuming food that they crave. On the other hand, they 
regret consuming it because it might be unhealthy in the long run. For each 
food item shown below, indicate how regretful you feel about your 
consumption. [Try to consider calories in the food items to assess your 
regret.] You have to indicate the intensity of your regret using the scale 
below.  
 
Then they saw the six food items, all on the same screen. Participants indicated their 
consumption regret for each item on a 5-point scale wherein 1= “no regret at all” and 
5= “very strong regret.”  
 
 
OTHER MEASURES 
All participants reported whether they were involved, attentive, careful, and thoughtful 
during the study (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree) and indicated their mood 
(1=very bad, 7=very good), gender, age, height and weight. The same measures were 
used in Study 2, Study 3, and Study 4.  
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Appendix 2A. Procedure for Study 2 (Paper 1) (continued) 
 
INSTRUCTIONAL MANIPULATION CHECK 
 
Responses from participants who did not follow the instruction were excluded from 
the main analyses. The same stimulus and exclusion criterion was used in Study 2, 
Study 3, and Study 4. 
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Appendix 2B. Supplementary analysis without excluding participants based on 
instructional manipulation check or completion time for Study 2 (Paper 1) 
 
DV: Reported regret 
 
Reported regret was compared using a mixed-design ANCOVA with evaluation mode 
as a between-subjects factor and food type as a within-subjects factor. To reduce the 
noise potentially caused by the heterogeneity of the online participants, participants’ 
BMI was entered as a covariate in the model. Reported regret was higher when it was 
evaluated in the natural mode than in the deliberative mode (Mnatural = 2.61, Mdeliberative 
= 2.10), F(1, 97) = 5.11, p < .05. The pattern of result is identical to the pattern found 
in the analysis with the response exclusion.  
 
DV: Attention to consumption extent 
 
Reported regret was regressed on extent evaluation, a dummy variable set to 1 for the 
extent salient condition, and their interaction term. In addition, the model controlled 
for participants’ BMI. The coefficient of extent evaluation was not significant in this 
model, β = -.06, p > .11, suggesting that extent evaluation was not a significant 
predictor of regret in the natural condition. The interaction between the dummy 
variable and extent evaluation was significant, β = .28, p < .001, suggesting that the 
effect of extent evaluation was stronger in the extent salient condition. A follow up 
analysis of simple slopes (Aiken and West 1991) showed that extent evaluation was a 
positive and significant predictor of regret in the extent salient condition, β = .22, p < 
.001. The pattern of result is identical to the pattern found in the analysis with the 
response exclusion. 
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Appendix 3A. Procedure for Study 3 (Paper 1) 
 
PRIME MANIPULATION 
All participants were told that as the first part of several unrelated questionnaires, they 
will first participate in a study that is related to a campaign in the future. All 
participants read the following instruction. 
 
On the next page, you will be shown a poster that will be used for a campaign 
in the future. Please take a careful look at the poster. You will be allowed to 
advance past the poster after a certain amount of time. You will be asked 
several questions related to the poster later in the study. 
 
Participants assigned to the affect based prime condition saw the poster shown below.  
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Appendix 3A. Procedure for Study 3 (Paper 1) (continued) 
 
Participants assigned to the extent based prime condition saw the poster shown below. 
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Appendix 3A. Procedure for Study 3 (Paper 1) (continued) 
 
DELIBERATIVE CONDITION 
Participants assigned to the deliberative condition read the following instructions. 
 
MONTHLY CALORIE CONSUMPTION 
On the following, you will see several food categories. You have to indicate 
how many calories from that particular food category you consume per 
month. There are no correct or incorrect responses for these questions. We 
are interested in your truthful estimates.  
 
On the following screen, they read the following instructions. 
 
For each food category shown below, please indicate how many calories you 
consume per month. Just enter a number indicating the number of calories 
that you consume per month. Please do not enter text or other symbols in the 
response field. 
 
Then they saw the three food categories, all on the same screen, and submitted the 
monthly calorie consumption amount for each food category using an open-ended text 
box. Then they reported the consumption regret (see below). 
 
NATURAL EVALUATION CONDITION 
Participants assigned to the natural condition were not asked submit their consumption 
amount. They directly reported their consumption regret (see below). 
 
 
CONSUMPTION REGRET 
All participants then saw the following screen, explaining to them the main dependent 
variable.  
 
People often have conflicting feelings about food they consume. On the one 
hand, they enjoy consuming food that they crave. On the other hand, they 
regret consuming it because it might be unhealthy in the long run. For each 
food item shown below, indicate how regretful you feel about your 
consumption. You have to indicate the intensity of your regret using the scale 
below.  
 
Then they saw the three food categories, all on the same screen. Participants indicated 
their consumption regret for each category on a 5-point scale wherein 1= “no regret at 
all” and 5= “very strong regret.”  
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Appendix 3A. Procedure for Study 3 (Paper 1) (continued) 
 
MANIPULATION CHECK 
Participants saw the poster they were shown earlier and responded to the question 
shown below on a 7-point scale wherein 1= “Emotional” and 7= “Quantitative.”  
 
Some messages are emotional in nature. Some messages use quantitative 
information In your opinion, is the above message emotional or quantitative?  
 civ 
Appendix 3B. Supplementary analysis without excluding participants 
based on instructional manipulation check or completion time for Study 3 
(Paper 1) 
 
DV: Reported regret 
 
Reported regret was submitted to a 2 (evaluation mode: natural vs. deliberative) x 2 
(prime type: affect-based (body-fat poster) vs. extent-based (calorie-information 
poster)) x 3 (food category: burgers & pizzas, fried food, and desserts) mixed model 
ANCOVA with evaluation mode and prime type as between-subjects factors and food 
category as a within-subjects factor. To reduce the noise potentially caused by the 
heterogeneity of the online participants, participants’ BMI was entered as a covariate 
in the model. Reported regret was higher in the natural mode than in the deliberative 
mode (Mnatural = 2.74, Mdeliberative = 2.32), F(1, 187) = 8.38, p < .01. There was a 
significant interaction of evaluation mode and prime type, F(1, 187) = 5.98, p < .05. 
Planned contrast analyses suggest that when extent evaluation was primed, there was 
no discrepancy between the behavior evaluations in the natural mode and in the 
deliberative mode, suggesting that extent-based prime mitigated extent neglect 
(Mnatural = 2.56, Mdeliberative = 2.49), F(1, 187) = 0.10, p > .75. When affective 
evaluation was primed, reported regret was higher in the natural mode than in the 
deliberative mode (Mnatural = 2.92, Mdeliberative = 2.14), F(1, 187) = 14.56, p < .001. The 
pattern of contrasts is identical to the pattern found in the analysis with the response 
exclusion. 
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Appendix 4A. Procedure for Study 4 (Paper 1) 
 
AROUSAL-INDUCING STIMULUS 
 
This stimulus was presented to all participants along with the instructions for calorie 
consumption estimation task and regret evaluation task shown below. 
 
DELIBERATIVE CONDITION 
Participants assigned to the deliberative condition read the following instructions. 
 
MONTHLY CALORIE CONSUMPTION 
On the following, you will see several food categories. You have to indicate 
how many calories from that particular food category you consume per 
month. There are no correct or incorrect responses for these questions. We 
are interested in your truthful estimates.  
 
On the following screen, they read the following instructions.  
 
For each food category shown below, please indicate how many calories you 
consume per month. Just enter a number indicating the number of calories 
that you consume per month. Please do not enter text or other symbols in the 
response field. 
 
Then participants assigned to the low [high] perceived diagnosticity of affective 
evaluation of food condition saw three unhealthy food categories [three unhealthy 
food categories and three healthy food categories], all on the same screen, and 
submitted the monthly calorie consumption amount for each food category using an 
open-ended text box. Then they reported the consumption regret (see below). 
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Appendix 4A. Procedure for Study 4 (Paper 1) 
 
NATURAL EVALUATION CONDITION 
Participants assigned to the natural condition were not asked submit their consumption 
amount. They directly reported their consumption regret (see below). 
 
CONSUMPTION REGRET 
All participants then saw the following screen, explaining to them the main dependent 
variable.  
 
People often have conflicting feelings about food they consume. On the one 
hand, they enjoy consuming food that they crave. On the other hand, they 
regret consuming it because it might be unhealthy in the long run. For each 
food item shown below, indicate how regretful you feel about your 
consumption. You have to indicate the intensity of your regret using the scale 
below.  
 
Then participants assigned to the low [high] perceived diagnosticity of affective 
evaluation of food condition saw three unhealthy food categories [three unhealthy 
food categories and three healthy food categories], all on the same screen. Participants 
indicated their consumption regret for each category on a 5-point scale wherein 1= “no 
regret at all” and 5= “very strong regret.”  
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Appendix 4B. Supplementary analysis without excluding participants based on 
instructional manipulation check or completion time for Study 4 (Paper 1) 
 
DV: Reported regret 
 
Reported regret was submitted to a 2 (evaluation mode: natural vs. deliberative) x 2 
(perceived diagnosticity of affective evaluation: low vs. high) x 3 (food category: 
burgers & pizzas, fried food, and desserts) mixed model ANCOVA with evaluation 
mode and perceived diagnosticity of affective evaluation as between-subjects factors 
and food category as a within-subjects factor. To reduce the noise potentially caused 
by the heterogeneity of the online participants, participants’ BMI was entered as a 
covariate in the model. There was a significant main effect of evaluation mode. 
Reported regret was higher in the natural mode than in the deliberative mode (Mnatural 
= 2.97, Mdeliberative = 2.54), F(1, 195) = 8.22, p < .01. Although the interaction of 
evaluation mode and perceived diagnosticity of affective evaluation did not reach 
statistical significance in this analysis, F(1, 195) = 3.14, p = .08, planned contrast 
analyses suggest that the predicted pattern of results were found. When perceived 
diagnosticity of affective evaluation was low, regret reported in the natural mode was 
higher than regret reported in the deliberative mode (Mnatural-low = 2.99, Mdeliberative-low = 
2.29, F(1, 195) = 10.83, p = .001. However, regret reported in the natural mode and 
that in the deliberative mode was not different when the perceived diagnosticity of 
affective evaluation was high (Mnatural-high= 2.95, Mdeliberative-high= 2.79), F(1, 195) = 
0.59, p > .44. The pattern of contrasts is identical to the pattern found in the analysis 
with the response exclusion.  
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Appendix 5 (Paper 2) 
Participants assigned to the card condition saw this screen for 60 seconds…. 
 
Participants assigned to the cash condition saw this screen for 60 seconds…. 
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Appendix 6 (Paper 2) 
Examples of Stimuli 
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Appendix 7 (Paper 2) 
Price and Pretest Ratings of Stimuli  
 
Product Price    
($) 
Impulsiveness  
Rating 
Healthfulness 
Rating 
VICE PRODUCTS 
Little Debbie’s Mini Donuts  1.79 4.53 1.18 
Little Debbie Marshmallow Fudge Cookies  1.79 4.47 1.24 
Perry’s Ice Cream Sandwiches 2.99 4.49 1.27 
Oreo Cookies  2.99 3.76 1.29 
m&m Chocolate Candies 2 pack  1.49 4.31 1.33 
Pepperidge Farm 3-layer Vanilla Cake  2.99 4.02 1.39 
Lays Classic Chips  2.00 3.63 1.47 
TGI Friday’s Mozzarella Sticks  3.79 3.90 1.49 
Ben & Jerry’s Vanilla Ice Cream  2.99 3.88 1.61 
Mousse Temptation by Jello  3.59 3.92 1.61 
Red Baron Classic Crust Pepperoni Pizza  3.99 2.90 1.71 
Jello-O Pudding Chocolate Vanilla Swirls  3.19 3.73 1.73 
Heineken Beer 6 pack 7.99 2.80 1.84 
Ore-Ida French Fries  2.79 2.59 1.94 
Little Debbie Chocolate Chip Muffins  2.59 3.86 1.94 
VIRTUE PRODUCTS 
Progresso Light Vegetable Soup  2.49 2.53 3.49 
Brownberry Wholewheat Grains Bread  3.99 1.47 3.98 
Upstate Farms Fat Free Milk  1.54 1.12 4.02 
Dannon Light & Fit Nonfat Yogurt  0.50 2.71 4.12 
Quaker Hearty Medley’s Hot Cereal  2.99 2.35 4.16 
Del Monte Fresh Cut Green Beans  0.79 1.96 4.20 
Large Eggs  1.19 1.25 4.24 
Birds Eye Steamfresh Fresh Frozen Vegetables  1.99 2.22 4.24 
Dole Ready Cut Fruit 2.99 3.25 4.25 
Poland Springs Bottled Water  4.49 2.20 4.49 
Fresh Farm Raised Salmon  5.49 2.57 4.61 
Earthbound Farm Organic Romaine Salads  3.99 1.53 4.73 
Green Seedless Grapes  1.99 2.22 4.76 
Greenhouse Grown Tomatoes  2.19 1.45 4.76 
Pink Lady Apples  1.99 2.06 4.80 
 
 
 
 
